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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 21/82)



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INTERNATIONAL

ROLE OF REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES IN THIRD WORLD DISCUSSED

Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII in Russian NO 4, Apr 82 pp 55-67

[Article by Yu. V. Irkhin: "Revolutionary Vanguard Parties of Working People in Liberated Countries" under the rubric "Follow-Up on the Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress"]

[Text] There has been an increase in the number of countries with socialist orientation, countries that chose the path of socialist development.... In these countries, revolutionary parties reflecting the interests of the broad masses of workers have been gaining in strength.

L. I. Brezhnev

A characteristic feature of the current stage of the world revolutionary process is the expansion and deepening of the struggle of the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America against imperialism and domestic reaction and for democratic transformations and socialism. The ranks of the countries with socialist orientation that had arisen during the 1960s in Asia and Africa (the Algerian People's Democratic Republic, the Guinean People's Revolutionary Republic, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the People's Republic of Congo, the United Republic of Tanzania, and others) were complemented in the 1970s by the People's Republic of Angola, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the People's Republic of Benin, the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, the People's Republic of Mozambique, Socialist Ethiopia, etc. The rise of these states in Asia and Africa has been accompanied by the formation of an extensive zone of countries with socialist orientation, having an aggregate population of some 150 million persons and an aggregate area of more than 12 million sq m.¹ In Latin America the path of social progress was taken in the 1970s by Nicaragua and Granada and the revolutionary struggle of El Salvador and various other countries on that continent is being expanded.

In the development of the revolutionary process in Asia, Africa, and certain countries of Latin America, an important role is played by revolutionary democracy. Revolutionary-democratic forces, groups, and parties, rule virtually all the countries with socialist orientation and are an important factor expressing public anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist tendencies in many liberated countries. Moreover, they take an active part in modern national-liberation movements and often even head them. A characteristic feature of the development of revolutionary-

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democratic forces in Asia, Africa, and Latin America during the 1970s and early 1980s has been their greater consistency in occupying anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist positions. In some of these countries, revolutionary parties are beginning to be established according to the principles of scientific socialism and are strengthening their cooperation with the communist movement and the countries of the socialist community: this is another characteristic feature. The candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the CC CPSU B. N. Ponomarev stresses that "the revolutionary-democratic and national-democratic parties and movements increasingly often declare themselves to be friends and comrades-in-arms of the CPSU, the communist movement. Indicative is the following fact: while the 25th CPSU Congress was attended by representatives of 19 such parties, the 26th Congress was attended by 36. The ranks of revolutionary democracy experience a leaning toward scientific socialism, toward arming themselves with Marxist-Leninist teachings and with the organizational and political principles of building vanguard parties of workers."²

The historic possibility of the formation of revolutionary parties in backward and dependent countries and their evolution into parties of Marxist-Leninist type was first declared and substantiated by V. I. Lenin. In a report to the commission on nationality and colonial questions at the 2nd Komintern Congress, and in his report theses, V. I. Lenin pointed to the possibility of the emergence, in backward countries, of "elements of future proletarian parties,"³ called upon to unify and embody the elemental leaning of the working masses toward socialism based on a scientific theory. He repeatedly pointed out that the revolutionary parties in backward countries have to accomplish a great deal of work on the path of their transformation into communist parties, and he warned them against a bias toward [ultra-]leftism. Thus, in reply to the question by delegates from the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] whether "Should not a national-revolutionary party turn into the communist party?" Lenin answered that he did recommend it, because a party "cannot be 'transformed' into another party." Lenin stressed that "much has yet to be accomplished by revolutionaries in promoting their state, economic, and cultural construction before the proletarian mass can be created from pastoral elements and subsequently assist in 'transforming' a national-revolutionary party into a communist party. The mere replacing of the name-plate is harmful and dangerous."⁴ The transformation of the MPRP into the party of the working class took place only as late as in the 1940s after the necessary conditions for it became ripe.⁵

The problem of the formation of revolutionary parties in the liberated countries and their evolution into parties of the Marxist-Leninist type at the present stage is considered in various studies of modern national-liberation revolutions and developing countries.⁶ There exist no special overall monograph surveys published on the history of the formation of revolutionary vanguard parties in the liberated countries during the 1970s and early 1980s, as yet. Works by Soviet historians deal with, as a rule, aspects of the formation of individual vanguard parties. The first attempt at an analysis of the formative history of several vanguard parties at a time, and at their comparative analysis (as exemplified by Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau), was made in the book by O. V. Martyshev.⁷

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The need to consider this kind of questions is due to the fact that they are being distorted by bourgeois historians. T. Parsons, D. Austin, S. Huntington, I. Nelson, P. B'yarne [name transliterated], and others actively comment against the formation of vanguard parties in the liberated countries, regarding this process as a real threat to the neocolonial interests of the imperialist powers. They put a false construction on the activities of such parties, attempting to prove that the peoples of the liberated countries supposedly are not "ripe" for socialism and should necessarily pass through a lengthy stage of bourgeois development, or the stage of "modernization."⁸ The bourgeois ideologists consider the idea of a vanguard party basing its activities on the principles of scientific socialism to be "alien" and unacceptable to the developing countries.⁹

In this connection, it is becoming particularly topical to analyze the question of the patterns and special features of the transition of revolutionary-democratic forces to the positions of scientific socialism, and of the paths whereby these forces form revolutionary vanguard parties on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Below an attempt is made to examine the basic historical forms, patterns, and features of the formation and development of revolutionary vanguard parties in the liberated countries of Asia and Africa on the basis of materials pertaining to the 1970s and early 1980s. The principal source for analyzing the activities of these parties is their program documents, the speeches and articles of their leaders, and the revolutionary-democratic party press.¹⁰

In Soviet and foreign Marxist historical science the revolutionary vanguard parties of workers are defined as parties of the transition type, meaning transition from revolutionary-democratic to Marxist-Leninist parties. The vanguard parties display a number of class features and characteristics common to those of the parties of the Marxist-Leninist type. They acknowledge Marxism-Leninism to be their ideological basis, substruct their activities on the principles of democratic centralism, and complement their ranks through individual selection of the best representatives of the working class, peasantry, and other laboring strata of the population. It is these features that account for the vanguard nature of these parties, which represent a distinctive proto-image of parties of the Marxist-Leninist type. As for the difference between the revolutionary-democratic vanguard parties of workers and parties of the Marxist-Leninist type, it consists in that their members do not as yet fully assimilate and apply in practice scientific communism, the share of the working (especially cadre) class in their membership is small, and their primary organizations are insufficiently strong and active in industry and army and are absent in some important spheres of the economy and public life. Hence, the vanguard parties are markedly inferior to communist parties as regards the level of maturity of [Marxist-Leninist] theory among their cadres, the degree of their revolutionary influence on workers, and their ideological-political and organizational experience. Their social basis consists of non-proletarian strata of workers, the working class in its formative stage, and the intelligentsia.

Soviet and foreign historical and political literature abounds in developed definitions and names of vanguard parties in countries with socialist orientation. These names and definitions reflect the vanguard nature of the parties, their social basis, and their class orientation. They are such names and definitions as "revolutionary-democratic vanguard parties," "vanguard parties of workers," "parties of the worker-peasant vanguard."¹¹ It appears that the social composition

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and political character of these parties are most precisely contained in the definition "revolutionary vanguard parties of workers," or, more briefly, "vanguard parties" of the liberated countries.

A major contribution to the substantiation and depiction of the role of the revolutionary vanguard parties at the present stage of national-liberation movement was made by the 26th CPSU Congress. The report submitted by the CC CPSU and the speeches of foreign delegations at the congress pointed out that the establishment and consolidation of these parties are dictated by the objective needs of the development and deepening of the revolutionary process and are part of the pattern of socialist orientation, of struggle for socialism. An important theoretical conclusion by the congress, which is of primary importance to the revolutionary-democratic forces, is that socialist orientation is to be regarded as a purposive process which needs to be effectively and scientifically directed by a revolutionary party. The report submitted by the CC CPSU reveals the main directions of revolutionary transformations in the countries that chose the path of socialist development. "Namely, the gradual liquidation of the positions of imperialist monopolies, indigenous big bourgeoisie and feudal landlords as well as restricting the activities of foreign capital. Further, this means providing the national economy with commanding heights in economics and changing over to a planned development of productive forces, as well as promoting the cooperative movement in the countryside. Further still, this means increasing the role of the working masses in public life and gradually strengthening the machinery of state with cadres devoted to the people."¹²

The conclusions of the 26th CPSU Congress concerning the actual problems of revolutionary and democratic movement in the liberated countries are of primary importance to the vanguard parties. The general secretary of the CC of the National Democratic Party of Afghanistan B. Karmal observed that "the comprehensive analysis of the development of the liberated countries provided at the 26th Congress is of exceptional value to the NDPA. The party, since recently the ruling party, particularly acutely needs a theoretical substantiation of the prospects for the revolutionary-democratic development of the country--prospects allowing for objective conditions and subjective factors."¹³ A genuinely scientific level of leadership of the process of struggle for the socialist perspective of these countries as well as the education of broad masses of the people on the basis of the principles of scientific communism and the development of democratic activity of workers and an increase in their role in public life can be assured only by a vanguard party armed with Marxism-Leninism and called upon to become the directing motive power and guarant of socialist orientation. The experience of Ghana, Mali, Egypt, etc. demonstrates that without such a party the tasks of the national-democratic revolution cannot be accomplished and the stability of revolutionary-democratic regimes cannot be assured.

The left wing of revolutionary democracy increasingly arms itself with the Marxist-Leninist idea of forming revolutionary vanguard parties on the principles of scientific communism, since this idea corresponds most to its current interests and possibilities.¹⁴ Revolutionary democracy has already basically utilized the revolutionary potential and possibilities of organizations of the broad national front type. These days a topical problem to an overwhelming majority of the

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detachments of revolutionary democracy is the problem of creating and consolidating vanguard parties as embryos of parties of the Marxist-Leninist type. The document of the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties of Tropical and Southern Africa declares: "Revolutionary experience demonstrates that only the establishment of an anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist revolutionary organization basing itself on the support of workers and other patriotic strata of the population can serve to consistently accomplish and defend radical socio-economic reforms. Already many organizations which originated as broad revolutionary-democratic movements have commenced the process of their transformation. We welcome this trend and consider such organizations to be part of the newly forming and growing group of Marxist revolutionary vanguards on our continent."¹⁵

A major effect on the formation of the world outlook of present-day revolutionary democracy is produced by the example of real socialism, by the active support provided by countries of the socialist community to all anti-imperialist revolutionary-democratic movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

A differentiation is taking place within the ranks of the revolutionary-democratic forces, along with a strengthening of the positions of the left wing of revolutionary democracy, and the coming to power, in a number of countries in Africa, Asia, and Central America, of the "second generation" of revolutionary democrats who have extensive experience in class struggle, are familiar with the experience of real socialism and the basic premises of Marxism-Leninism, have actively collaborated with communists in the course of anti-imperialist struggle, and do not reject joint activity under the new conditions. The aforementioned document of the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties of Tropical and Southern Africa states that: "in the last few years an increasing number of revolutionary democrats has adopted a positive point of view toward Marxism-Leninism."¹⁶

The formation of the vanguard parties results from the conceptual impact of the CPSU's experience on the revolutionary democracy as well as from understanding the Leninist tenet of the need to create a vanguard organization of the working class in the struggle to build a new society. Thus, the chairman of the Central Committee of the Congolese Labor Party (CLP), Denis Sassou-Nguesso, characterizes as follows the political platform of CLP: "[It is] a vanguard party whose organizational structure, orientation, and end-goal are defined on the basis of the revolutionary experience of parties of a new type among which the brightest example is the party of Lenin."¹⁷

The creation of the revolutionary vanguard parties signifies a qualitatively new stage in the evolution of revolutionary democracy and the development of countries with socialist orientation. B. N. Ponomarev points out: "In certain countries progressing along the path of socialist development, the ruling revolutionary-democratic parties (for example, in the People's Republic of Angola, the People's Republic of Mozambique, Socialist Ethiopia, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the People's Republic of the Congo, and others) proclaim Marxism-Leninism to be the ideological and political basis of their activity. The leaning toward scientific socialism among the vanguard detachments of the national-liberation movement is becoming increasingly more explicit."¹⁸ The experience of the development of revolutionary-democratic forces in the liberated countries is a shining

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affirmation of Lenin's conclusion that "in the 20th century... one cannot be a revolutionary democrat /if one fears/ [printed in italics] advancing toward socialism."¹⁹

In the 1970s the process of the formation and strengthening of the vanguard parties has been taking place in the group of countries with socialist orientation as well as in certain other liberated countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Congolese Labor Party, established in 1969, has been gaining in strength. In 1977 the following turned into vanguard parties: the Mozambique National Liberation Front (FRELIMO)--the party retained its original name, and the National Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which was renamed MPLA--Labor Party. In 1975 there arose the Party of People's Revolution of Benin (PPRB), and in 1978, the Yemenite Socialist Party (YSP). Toward the end of 1979 the crisis within the National-Democratic Party of Afghanistan (established in 1975, became the ruling party in April 1978) was overcome. In 1980 in Nicaragua work was begun to transform the Sandinist Front of National Liberation (SFNL) into a vanguard organization, the Sandinist revolutionary party (as yet, a conditional name). In 1979 in Ethiopia there was created the Commission for the Organization of a Workers Party (COWPE). The process of formation of vanguard parties can be observed in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, the Republic of Cape Verde Island, the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, and Bahr in.²⁰

Historical experience demonstrates that the formative process of parties of the vanguard type in countries with socialist orientation may assume various forms and proceed along different paths. One direction taken by this process is the formation of vanguard parties in the countries with socialist orientation where revolutionary-democratic parties or groups already exist. In this case, the left wing of revolutionary democracy can utilize the experience and part of cadres of the revolutionary-democratic party when establishing the vanguard party. The CLP, for example, was founded in 1969 by M. Nguabi [name transliterated], the leader of the left wing of the mass party National Revolutionary Movement which had existed in the Congo from 1964 until 1968. In Angola and Mozambique in 1977 parties-movements became transformed into vanguard parties.

Another direction is that of the formation of vanguard parties in the countries in which revolutionary-democratic parties previously were absent. In this case, revolutionary or military-revolutionary democrats begin to form vanguard parties chiefly with their own forces. This precisely has happened in Benin, where the military-revolutionary government headed by M. Kerekou, which came to rule in 1972, established in 1975 the Party of People's Revolution of Benin. The First Extraordinary Congress of the PPRB in 1976 adopted the party program and consolidated the course of development of the country on the basis of the principles of scientific socialism. In Ethiopia the progressive wing of the ruling military-revolutionary democracy, while heading the process of the formation of a vanguard party, at the same time strives to cooperate with those political organizations or their representatives which or who support the government's policies. The third form of establishing a vanguard party is a rapprochement of positions, followed by the unification of Marxist and revolutionary-democratic organizations on a common platform of scientific socialism. In the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1975 the political organization of the National Front, the

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People's Democratic Union, and the Party of the People's Vanguard merged into a united political organization called the National Front on the basis of which the Yemenite Socialist Party was created in 1978. In principle, other paths of the formation of vanguard parties also are possible.

Clearly, the creation of a vanguard party is an objective necessity and law of the onward progress of the liberated countries in the direction of socialism. R. A. Ul'yanovskiy states: "The socialist orientation presupposes first of all an effective political leadership by vanguard parties or by an alliance of parties forming the front of progressive forces. The idea of creating vanguard parties which are close in their nature to parties of scientific socialism, as put forward by many revolutionary democrats, is a constructive idea."²¹

Bourgeois historians and political pundits claim that the liberated countries supposedly lack the necessary social basis, and primarily the proletariat, for establishing vanguard and communist parties.²² But an analysis of the numbers of the working class and its share in the social structure of the countries with a socialist orientation, as well as of its role in the vanguard parties, produces an opposite conclusion. Although the share of the working class in the social structure of these countries is smaller than in the developed countries, in Asia and Africa the proletariat--including factory and plant workers--had emerged on the political arena as early as in the 1950s and 1960s and it continues to grow rapidly in numbers. Between 1960 and 1973 alone the working class in Africa increased by 5 million people or 35.2 percent, and at present it consists of more than 19 million people.²³ In the countries with socialist orientation the overall growth in the numbers of workers is accompanied by a rapid increase in the numbers of skilled workers due to the growth of the state sector, the stabilization of the labor force, and improvements in the system of the occupational training and education of workers. In Congo, for example, the size of the working class between 1963 and the present increased from 40,000 to 70,000 persons, and its proportion in the gainfully employed population rose from 7 percent to 12 percent.²⁴ In Ethiopia there are about 100,000 factory and plant workers and the agricultural proletariat consists of some 310,000 persons. In Algeria there are 370,000 industrial workers, and in Mozambique, more than 100,000.²⁵ The materials of the First Congress of the Yemenite Socialist Party point out that one of the principal changes that took place in the country's social structure and in the party's social composition since the mid-1970s has been "the rapid growth of the numbers of hired workers. Within this huge army of workers there begins to arise a stratum of skilled workers and technicians associated with the new system of production, who represent the hard core of the Yemenite working class."²⁶ The General Secretary of the Universal Confederation of Trade Union Workers of the PDRY, Sultan ad-Dash [name transliterated] announced: "Today three-fourths of the 100,000 trade-union members are workers."²⁷

Consequently, the working class in the countries with socialist orientation indisputably can and indeed does provide the principal social basis for the formation of vanguard parties. Their program documents and charters contain provisions that exclude from membership any reactionary and non-working elements and stipulate the primary role of representatives of the working class and working people in the party and in the socio-political life of the countries with socialist orientation. For example, the charter of the YSR states that "admission to membership in the party granted through an individualized procedure to candidates

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who complete the stage of candidateship. Membership in the party is granted to the most conscious and active representatives of workers, peasants, soldiers, and other strata of working people and revolutionary intelligentsia. For workers, members of peasant and fishery cooperatives and soldiers (of worker and peasant origin) the stage of candidateship lasts one year and for all others, two years."²⁸

The purposeful drive of the vanguard parties to recruit to their ranks the best representatives of the working class is producing fruit. For example, the proportion of workers in the CLP climbed to 31.5 percent of its total membership of some 7,000.²⁹ In the PDRY during the three years of preparations to establish the YSP [Yemenite Socialist Party] (from 1975 until 1978) the proportion of workers in the vanguard political organization climbed to 55.7 percent. At present the YSP has a membership of 26,000 of whom 13.2 percent are workers and 12.8 percent peasants.³⁰ The MPLA-Labor Party is actively working to recruit workers for its membership. Thus, in recent years its membership in the Northern Luanda mining region increased from 274 to 1,137, and the number of party cells rose to 112. Workers account for 51 percent of the party's total membership. Of the 31,000 members and candidate members of the MPLA-Labor Party, industrial workers account for 25.9 percent; agricultural workers, more than 23 percent; peasants, 1.9 percent; the intelligentsia and technician personnel, 6 percent; and white-collar workers and managers, more than 39 percent.³¹

Vanguard parties in the countries with socialist orientation organize cells at larger enterprises. For example, four party cells consisting of 80 members and candidate members of the YSP operate among the 1,350 blue- and white-collar workers of the Port of Aden.³² Luanda's largest industrial enterprise, the Textang Textile Factory, is the site of MPLA-Labor Party cells numbering 60 members, established in 1978.³³ A chapter of FRELIMO has been organized at the Mabor plant, a large industrial enterprise in Maputu, the nation's capital.³⁴ As pointed out at the Fifth Plenum of the PDPA Central Committee (1981), 25 percent of the new members and candidate members of the party are cadre workers and working peasants.³⁵

In Mozambique, in accordance with the decisions of the Third Plenum of the FRELIMO Central Committee, the year 1978 was declared to be "the year of party construction." The plenum put forward the slogan, "We shall build the party in order to better organize our life." Under this program, a national seminar on party construction was held on 17 February 1978 with participation by the leadership of FRELIMO. In May 1978 a seminar of party organization secretaries on organizational work was held in Maputu. These seminars activated the drive for party construction. Thousands of Mozambican working people applied for admission to the party. They mostly consisted of workers, peasants, and members of the armed forces and security troops. The main aspect of that drive was that, "parallel to the growth in the number of candidates augmenting the party's ranks," as pointed out in the Mozambique press, "the class awareness of the working people is also increasing."³⁶ The measures taken caused the membership of FRELIMO to increase to 35,000 persons associated in more than 1,000 party organizations.³⁷

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The vigorous work to create and strengthen party cells resulted in an increase in the number of primary organizations in all vanguard parties. In the PDRY the number of primary organizations of the Yemenite Socialist Party has increased by 10 percent between 1975 and 1978 and amounts to some 1,500. In Angola about 3,000 primary party organizations are active.³⁸ The primary organizations of the vanguard parties are created chiefly according to the territorial-production principle. In some cases there arises a number of difficulties associated with the formation of party cells in enterprises and establishments where class consciousness is insufficiently developed among workers, especially where the number of illiterates is large. In view of this, the vanguard parties devote more attention to ideological-political and educational work with broad masses of working people.

An organic part of the process of increase in the share of the working class in the membership of the vanguard parties is the elimination of bourgeois elements from these parties. Parties of the vanguard type differ from revolutionary-democratic organizations chiefly in their more explicit class composition and more resolute ideological-political platform. The rightist groups and elements in the ruling circles and the machinery of state of the countries with socialist orientation, which realize that the formation of the vanguard parties objectively presupposes their elimination from membership and the strengthening of the course toward socialism, resist this process and attempt to impede the creation of vanguard organizations and, in the final analysis, turn the young countries away from the progressive path of development. Thus, in the PDRY the opportunist grouping headed by S. Ali acted to oppose the decision to organize the vanguard party of working people. The group made demagogic declarations stating that a vanguard party had supposedly been formed long ago in the PDRY, and it agitated for reducing relations with the socialist countries and developing contacts with reactionary Arab regimes. When, however, the grouping realized that the process of the formation of a vanguard party of working people in the PDRY cannot be halted, it attempted on 26 June 1978 a coup d'etat which was foiled by revolutionary forces. The heads of the YSP pointed out that the clique of "opportunists" opposed the creation of the YSP, claiming that the Yemenite working class is still small in numbers and has a low level of awareness. But we believe that, despite the small size of the working class in Yemen (in our country there are about 80,000 blue- and white-collar workers out of a total population of 1.75 million), the leading role can be assured by a revolutionary vanguard with a clear-cut ideological platform."³⁹

The optimal approach to the formation and strengthening of vanguard parties of working people is one when the process of the consolidation of positions of the left wing of the ruling revolutionary democracy and its transition to the positions of scientific socialism occurs in an inseparable connection with the process of enhancement of the role of the working class and working people in the party, state, and public life of the countries with socialist orientation. These processes objectively occur as interwoven tendencies. Consistent proponents of the course toward socialism among the ruling revolutionary democracy are objectively interested in support by the laboring masses while the working class and other laboring strata of the population, in measure with the growth of their awareness, provide increasing support to the progressive policy of the revolutionary-democratic forces.

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The share of workers belonging to the vanguard parties of working people in the deliberations of party congresses is increasing. This contributes to the adoption of decisions promoting the interests of broad masses of working people, and to the activation of the party's work to implement these decisions. Of the 459 delegates taking part in the deliberations of the First Extraordinary Congress of the Yemenite Socialist Party on 12-14 October 1980, workers accounted for 21.9 percent; peasants, 6 percent; the intelligentsia, 40 percent; administrative employees, 19.5 percent; and soldiers, 10.6 percent.⁴⁰ The congress approved the basic directions and indicators of the second Five-Year Plan for the Development of the PDRY for 1981-1985. Major attention at the congress was devoted to aspects of improving organizational-party work and the social-class structure of the party, as well as the qualitative composition of the party's leadership, and increasing its share of workers and other working people. Recently the YSP replaced party cards, which was of major organizational and political-educational importance.⁴¹ In January 1982 an important political measure commenced in Afghanistan--the issuance of party documents to members and candidate members of the PDPA. In the last one and one-half years its membership has doubled. The party's ranks are being augmented with pace-setting workers, peasants, soldiers, and the intelligentsia. The striving of working people to link their fate to the party is an eloquent proof of its growing authority and the trust placed in it by the popular masses. The PDPA has 62,000 members and candidate members associated in 1,656 party cells. Of the 18,000 members and candidate members joining the PDPA in 1982 40 percent were workers and peasants.⁴²

A major place in the activities of the vanguard parties is occupied by problems of the management of mass organizations of working people, of restructuring them on a revolutionary basis, enhancing their role in the country socio-economic life, increasing their membership, and refining their structure. Special attention is being devoted by the vanguard parties of working people to improving the activities of the trade unions, which even now represent a real political force in the countries with socialist orientation. In Ethiopia, for example, during the years of the revolution, the membership of the All-Ethiopian Trade Union increased from 100,000 to 350,000.⁴³ The membership of the Congolese Trade Unions Federation has more than doubled during the years of the revolution and now amounts to 85,000.⁴⁴ The Universal Confederation of Trade Union Workers of the PDRY has doubled in membership within 4 years and now has 100,000 members.⁴⁵ Trade unions in the countries with socialist orientation were granted the right of supervising working conditions at enterprises and participating in the preparation of plans for the country's political, economic, and social development.

An important school of class awareness for the working class of the countries with socialist orientation is the participation of that class in elections to the organs of people's authorities and its subsequent participation in these authorities. The vanguard parties, as a rule, promote this process. In Angola, for example, the "Law of Elections" (1980) granted to the population of that country broad electoral powers. At the same time, this law provides for certain restrictions on persons who had collaborated with the colonial regime or take part in actions against state security, in acts of sabotage, or who are involved in corruption, smuggling, speculation, etc. Candidates for province deputies were nominated from among activists of the MPLA-Labor Party, trade unions, youth organiza-

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tions, and women's organizations. This accounted for the high proportion of the working class and other working people elected to the provincial people's assemblies, whose deputies consist 40 percent of workers, 30 percent of peasants, 10 percent of representatives of the intelligentsia, 10 percent of employees of the state administration, and 10 percent of the military.⁴⁶ The elected deputies of the people's assemblies--the central ruling bodies in Angola and Mozambique--consist correspondingly of 28.5 and 31.4 percent of workers, respectively, and 22.6 and 28.7 percent of peasants, respectively.⁴⁷ Of the 111 deputies to the Supreme People's Council of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, about 50 percent are workers and peasants (1978 elections).⁴⁸

A primary role in the strengthening of the vanguard parties is played by elevation of the level of ideological and political-educational work both among party members and among the broad masses of working people. The vanguard parties consider it an important task for their members to master the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism. At the same time, they promote the propaganda of the ideas of scientific socialism among the popular masses. The documents of the Third Congress of FRELIMO state: "Marxism-Leninism is the ideological and theoretical basis of our party. So that it may become a genuine vanguard of the laboring classes, the party should be armed with a revolutionary theory which would enable party members to correctly understand the laws of social development and revolution. Without such an ideological and theoretical basis the party cannot lead the struggle of the working masses and have them follow it. This basis is Marxism-Leninism. The party will always guide itself by the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism on allowing for the specific conditions of development of the class struggle in our country."⁴⁹

To train qualified party and administrative cadres, workers of public organizations of working people, and propagandists and agitators, special party and state educational institutions have been established in the countries with socialist orientation. They are: the Higher School of Scientific Socialism in Aden (1971), the Central Party School in Mozambique (1975), the Political School named after the February Revolution in Addis-Abeba (1976), the Party school in Brazzaville (1973), the Party school in Guinea-Bissau (1978). Scientific socialism is being studied at the Aden, Addis-Abeba, and other universities of the countries with socialist orientation. In the PDRY, for example, some 10,000 persons have been graduated from the Higher School of Scientific Socialism.⁵⁰ The number of activists who completed the Political School in Ethiopia exceeds 8,000, and the graduates of Afghanistan's Institute of Social Sciences under the PDPA Central Committee number 1,600.⁵¹ During 1977-1979 the party schools in Angola trained more than 2,200 persons of whom 40 percent were representatives of the country's working class. The country's first "rabfak" [workers' faculty] has been established at Kabul University in 1981 (with an enrollment of about 500).⁵²

Recently a number of new party or political journals dealing with actual problems of Marxist-Leninist theory has been founded in the countries with socialist orientation. These journals also concern themselves with party construction and problems of Marxist-Leninist education. In the PDRY, for example, the first issue of the monthly KADAYA AL-ASR [Problems of the Present Day] has been published. In Ethiopia, the quarterly "Marxist-Leninist ideological journal" MESKEREM [September], has been published since January 1980.⁵³

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The ideological activities of the vanguard parties serve the cause of imbuing the working class and all working people in the countries with socialist orientation, with a sense of responsibility for the fate of the revolution, awakening and developing their class consciousness, and familiarizing them with the principles of the scientific world outlook. The further strengthening of the vanguard parties on principles of Marxism-Leninism and enhancement of the role of the working class in all domains of public life in the countries with socialist orientation are prerequisites for their transition to socialism. Thus, in his speech at the 26th CPSU Congress, the Chairman of the MPLA-Labor Party Jose Eduardo dos Santos declared that "under the specific conditions of Angola our party gradually affirms its Marxist-Leninist nature."⁵⁴

Of invaluable importance to the strengthening of the vanguard parties is the development of their relations with the communist parties. During the 1970s there took place a number of joint international conferences and symposiums dealing with questions of theory, at which the communist and the revolutionary-democratic parties exchanged experience and opinions. A tendency toward the strengthening of ties between the CPSU and the vanguard parties of the liberated countries is observed. Recently, the USSR has been visited by party delegations from the YSP, MPLA-Labor Party, FRELIMO, PDPA, CLP, SFNL, and COWPE. In its turn, upon invitation by the vanguard parties, the CC CPSU has dispatched party delegations to the concerned countries. In the course of these visits, plans for cooperation between the CPSU and a majority of the vanguard parties, exchange of parliamentary delegations, and interaction in economics, science, and culture, were formalized.

The leaders of the vanguard parties prize highly the ties between the CPSU and the revolutionary-democratic forces of the liberated countries. The member of the CC CLP P. Nze commented in that context that "between the Congolese Labor Party and the CPSU excellent relations of friendship and cooperation have been established. The views of our parties on the basic international problems and questions of building socialism coincide. We are convinced that the successful implementation of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress will contribute to further strengthening the militant solidarity of our nations and parties."⁵⁵ The General Secretary of the YSP A. N. Muhammad stresses that the relations between the YSP and the CPSU "are of a militant, strategic nature. Our alliance with the CPSU has always been the solid basis for the development of Yemen's revolution. It contributes to defending national sovereignty and solving the social problems of Democratic Yemen. Our revolution has directly witnessed the unshakable adherence of the CPSU to the cause of internationalism."⁵⁶

As stressed at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, "The CPSU shall consistently adhere to the course of developing cooperation between the USSR and the liberated countries, strengthening the alliance of world socialism and national-liberation movement."⁵⁷ Support by the countries of the socialist community provides favorable external conditions for the formation and strengthening of the positions of the vanguard parties. The strengthening of the existing vanguard parties and provision of the necessary premises for their formation in a number of other countries objectively exist as a most important task for the revolutionary-democratic forces.

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FOOTNOTES

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8. For more detail see V. Ye. Chirkin, [Burzhuaznaya politologiya i deystvennost' razvivayushchikhsya stran] [Bourgeois Political Science and the Reality of the Developing Countries], Moscow, 1980.
9. See "Africa and International Communism," London, 1980; J. Sartori, "Parties and Party System," Vol 1, Cambridge, 1976; S. Huntington, I. Nelson, "No Easy Political Choice: Political Participation in the Development Societies," N. Y., 1976.

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10. See "Programmnyye dokumenty Beninskoy revolyutsii. Rabochiy klass i sovremennyy mir" [Program Documents of the Benin Revolution. The Working Class and the Present-Day World], No 6, 1977; "I s"yezd Narodnogo dvizheniya za osvobodzheniye Angoli (MPLA)" [First Congress of the National Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)], Moscow, 1978; "Materialy I s"yezda Yemenskoy sotsialisticheskoy partii" [Materials of the First Congress of the Yemenite Socialist Party], Moscow, 1979; "Dokumenty partii FRELIMO Narodnoy Respubliki Mozambik" [Documents of the FRELIMO Party of the People's Republic of Mozambique], Moscow, 1980; "Extraordinary Congress of the Yemenite Socialist Party, Aden, October 1980, Beirut, 1980 (in Arabic); "Vizit Babraka Karmalya v Sovetskiy Soyuz. Dokumenty i materialy" [The Visit of Babrak Karmal to the Soviet Union. Documents and Materials], Moscow, 1980; "Vizit Ali Nasera Mukhammeda v Sovetskiy Soyuz. Dokumenty i materialy" [The Visit of Ali Nasser Muhammad to the Soviet Union. Documents and Materials], Moscow, 1980; "Vizit Samory Moyzesa Mashela v Sovetskiy Soyuz" [The Visit of Samora Moises Machel to the Soviet Union], Moscow, 1980; "Basic Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan," in the book "Demokraticeskaya Respublika Afganistan" [The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan], Moscow, 1981; "Vizit Deni Sassu-Ngesso v Sovetskiy Soyuz" [The Visit of Denis Sassou-Nguesso to the Soviet Union], Moscow, 1981; "Programme du Parti Congolais du Travail, Brazzaville, 1972; "Basic Documents of the Ethiopian Revolution," Addis Ababa, 1977; "Relatorio de Comite Central ao I Congresso Extraordinario do MPLA--Partido trabalho," Luanda, 1980, et al.
11. P. I. Manchkha, "Aktual'nyye problemy sovremennoy Afriki" [Current Problems of Africa], Moscow, 1979, p 130; An. A. Gromyko, op. cit., p 75; "Dokumenty partii FRELIMO Narodnoy Respubliki Mozambik," op. cit. 206; Ye. M. Primakov, "Countries With Socialist Orientation: The Difficult but Real Transition to Socialism," MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 7, 1981, p 81; G. F. Kim, "The Insurmountable Process," PRAVDA, 20 June 1981.
12. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1981, p 12.
13. B. Karmal, "The Forum of Soviet Communists and Our Primary Tasks," KOMMUNIST, No 6, 1981, p 81.
14. The "revolutionary democracy" in the liberated countries is construed, in the social meaning of the term, as politically active strata of petty urban bourgeoisie, peasantry, and radical intelligentsia which take the positions of an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, and, to some extent, anti-capitalist struggle; in the political sense of the term, it is construed as the parties, organizations, and groups expressing the interests of these strata (see "Nauchnyy kommunizm. Slovar'" [A Dictionary of Scientific Communism], Moscow, 1981, p 227). The "left revolutionary-democratic wing" is construed to mean those revolutionary-democratic or national-democratic circles which change over to the positions of scientific socialism (see Ul'yanovskiy, op. cit., pp 58, 59).
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16. Ibid.

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18. B. N. Ponomarev, "Zhivoye i deystvennoye ucheniye marksizma-leninizma" [The Living and Effective Teaching of Marxism-Leninism], Moscow, 1981, p 99.
19. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 34, p 190.
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21. R. A. Ul'yanovskiy, "On the Countries With Socialist Orientation," KOMMUNIST, No 11, 1979, p 120.
22. F. Lloyd, "Classes, Crises, and Coups," London, 1977, p 128.
23. An. A. Gromyko, "Development Tendencies of the Working Class in the Countries of Africa," RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNYI MIR, No 5, 1978, p 11; "Rabochiy klass i rabocheye dvizheniye v Afrike" [The Working Class and Worker Movement in Africa], Moscow, 1979, p 13.
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28. "Materialy I s"yezda Yemenskoy sotsialisticheskoy partii," op. cit., pp 239-240.
29. Sassou-Nguesso, op. cit., p 94.
30. "Materialy I s"yezda Yemenskoy sotsialisticheskoy partii," op. cit., p 127.
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37. PRAVDA, 4 February 1979.
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40. "Extraordinary Congress of the Yemenite Socialist Party" [in Arabic], op. cit., pp 434-435.
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53. Yu. V. Irkhin, "A New Marxist Journal in Ethiopia," AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, No 2, 1982, p 55.
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55. Ibid., p 356.
56. Ibid., p 345.
57. "Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress," op. cit., p 15.

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THE NEW USSR CONSTITUTION AND ALIENS IN THE USSR

V. F. Gubin, Candidate of Law

Summary

As defined by Leonid I. Brezhnev the new Soviet Constitution, adopted at the Seventh (Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Ninth Convocation, succinctly summarized sixty years of the Soviet State development and became the fundamental law of life for the developed and mature socialist society in our country. Its adoption heralds a further development of the Soviet socialist democracy and an unprecedented in history broadening and deepening of rights of Soviet citizens, and it decisively influences the position of aliens in the USSR.

We treat aliens as persons present in the territory of a given state, who are not its citizens and subjected to its jurisdiction.

This article does not deal with the status of aliens enjoying any immunities. It deals with aliens as persons present in the territory of the Soviet Union who are not its citizens proper and who are fully subjected to its jurisdiction (political émigrés, foreign correspondents, tourists, students, representatives of foreign science, culture, social organizations, and business communities, crew members of foreign means of transportation, relatives and guests of Soviet citizens from abroad, etc.).

The status of citizens of other countries in the USSR is characterized by their dual subjection both to the law order of the country of residence and to that of the state of their nationality. Their rights and

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duties in the territory of the Soviet Union are defined by Soviet legislation as well as (by transformation) by the provisions of international agreements to which the USSR is a party. In accordance with these legal acts aliens in the USSR are, in principle, accorded national treatment, i. e., on the whole they are equated as to their rights and duties to the citizens proper of the Soviet Union. Art. 37 of the Constitution states as follows: «Citizens of other countries and stateless persons in the USSR are guaranteed the rights and freedoms provided by law ...». A number of special normative acts of the USSR and the Union Republics further concretize this provision and provide for some exceptions caused by the fact that citizens of other countries are in legal bond with the state of their nationality and by considerations of the state security of the USSR and its economic interests.

The legal status of aliens in the USSR depends to a certain extent upon such circumstances as the term, purpose, conditions of their stay, etc. Depending on the term of their residence in the USSR aliens are divided by Soviet legislation into two categories: (a) those temporarily present in the USSR and (b) those resident in the USSR. The latter comprises aliens who reside in the Soviet territory for not less than 18 months running and engage in any activity allowed by law. The international legal science also divides aliens into groups depending on their term of presence in a given country. It is considered as generally recognized that the scope of rights and du-

ties of resident and temporarily present aliens in a country is different.

The USSR Constitution reflects a generally acknowledged provision that the exercise by citizens of their rights and freedoms is inseparable from the fulfilment of their obligations. This elementary rule also applies to aliens present in the USSR. Just like their rights, their obligations are, on the whole, identical to those of Soviet citizens. However, aliens are relieved from certain rights and duties addressed solely to Soviet citizens (participation in the management of state affairs, duties to defend the USSR and to serve in the Armed Forces, taxation of bachelors and citizens without a child or with a small family, etc.).

Aliens who have committed crimes, misdemeanours and other offences are subjected to criminal, administrative and other responsibilities under Soviet law principally on the same footing as Soviet citizens. However, deportation from the Soviet Union as a punishment for committing a relevant offence is applied more often to them than to Soviet citizens.

The Soviet people and the Soviet State treat citizens of other states and stateless persons present in their country with all cordiality and hospitality. They often vest them with such rights and freedoms and extend to them such benefits of which no traces can be found in their native countries. Therefore, the Soviet people is entitled to expect that to their cordial «Welcome» foreign guests will reply by duly respecting Soviet laws, customs and traditions.

NUREMBERG PRINCIPLES AND MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW

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Summary

The Charter of the International Military Tribunal to try chief German war criminals and the indictment of the Tribunal, embodying the so called Nuremberg principles, were an important contribution to the development of international law.

Provisions of the Charter gave rise to a frantic discussion which to a certain extent continues up to now. This discussion focuses on two basic questions: to what extent the Nuremberg principles corresponded to international law at the time of their formulation, and what place they assume in modern international law.

Opponents of the Nuremberg principles subject to especially severe criticism the provisions of the International Military Tribunal Charter and of the indictment of this Tribunal which relate to crimes against peace. Arguments which have been and are brought up against the Nuremberg principles are based on a static view of international law, they are permeated with extreme

formalism, and they do not take into account the entire complexity of its rule-making process.

The appearance in international law of the principle of ban on an aggressive war and its characterization as an international crime was a necessary condition for the international criminal responsibility of individuals for crimes against peace. As is known, such a principle appeared in the period between World War I and World War II. The impetus in this direction was given by the Decree on Peace of November 1917 — the first legislative act of the first socialist State in the world. The Decree solemnly declared an annexationist and aggressive war as «the greatest crime against humanity».

The Paris Pact of 1923 for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, also containing obligations to settle international disputes by peaceful means only, marked the appearance of the aggressive war ban principle. In 1939 63 states were parties to this Pact, including Germa-

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ny, Italy, and Japan. The aggressive war ban principle soon became a generally recognized principle of international law.

It means that the question of international responsibility of state for the violation of the aggressive war ban principle, or in other words, the question of responsibility of aggressor-state was already definitely resolved in international law before World War II. All measures taken by the allied powers after the war with regard to Germany, Italy, Japan and their allies were legally based right on the principle of international responsibility of aggressor-state for an aggressive war.

The second question is the question of whether there existed international criminal responsibility of individuals in international law related to the responsibility of aggressor-state who actually committed acts in violation of the aggressive war ban principle.

It would be, of course, an overexaggeration to assert that the principle of international criminal responsibility of individuals for aggressive war was at the time as firmly established in international law as the principle of responsibility of state for such a war. However, the principle was already in the process of formulation during a certain period of time before World War II under which aggressive war was a criminal act and, therefore, its launching and waging had to entail not only a heavy responsibility of aggressor-state but also the international criminal responsibility of individuals who actually committed such acts. In other words, the process of coordinating the wills of states with regard to the recognition of international criminal responsibility of individuals for aggressive war started soon after World War I, and there is enough reason to assert that this view was embodied in the Paris Pact of 1928. The International Military Tribunal had enough ground to state in its indictment that «the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy necessarily involves the preposition that such a war is illegal in international law; and that those who plan and wage such a war with its inevitable and terrible consequences are committing a crime in so doing...».

The International Military Tribunal Charter completed the process of coordinating the wills of states with regard to the recognition of the principle of international criminal responsibility of individuals for an aggressive war, which lasted for rather a long time prior to the outbreak of World War II.

The Charters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals and their indictments were not the end of the Nuremberg principles. Being an international agreement concluded among the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, the Nuremberg Military Tribunal Charter was binding only over these states.

However, rules made by two or more states very often gradually obtain general recognition in international law. The principle

of the aggressive war ban may serve as one of the examples.

After being proclaimed in the Nuremberg Military Tribunal Charter the Nuremberg principles were recognized by all states as international law rules. There is many a proof to such recognition and, although, each of them taken separately is not sufficient, taken all together they constitute a sufficient amount of proofs for a general recognition of these principles by states.

One cannot but agree with Professor John Fried of New York University, a tireless advocate for the general recognition of the Nuremberg principles, who said the following in his presentation «The Positive Message of Nuremberg for the Nuclear Age» at the World Congress of the International Political Science Association held in Moscow in August 1979: «It is the thesis of this paper that in the view of the development of war technology since Nuremberg, the Nuremberg principles are becoming ever more essential than they were written almost a generation ago».

The Nuremberg principles have not only become a part of international law but they have influenced and continue to influence considerably its further development.

It was under the influence of the Nuremberg principles that the Soviet doctrine of international law put forward and substantiated the conception under which all violations of international law are divided into two categories: international crimes and international delicts. The first category comprises the most dangerous violations of international law by state, and the second one — all other international offences.

Of course, the term «crimes» is used here in a different sense than it is used in domestic law. It does not imply the recognition of the international criminal responsibility of state but it is used only to single out the most dangerous violations of international law by states, which entail a heavier responsibility of the violator-state as well as international criminal responsibility of relevant individuals.

This view was supported by the International Law Commission Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility Professor R. Ago, and by the Commission itself. In 1976 the Commission adopted Art. 19 of the draft articles on state responsibility entitled in the following way: «International Crimes and International Delicts». The Commission characterized international crimes as a breach of an international obligation by state which is so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by this community. The Commission has given in this article a number of examples of international crimes: a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the maintenance of international peace and security, such as that of prohibiting aggression; a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the right of self-determination of peoples; a serious breach of an international obligation of essential

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importance for safeguarding human environment, such as that of prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas.

The influence of the Nuremberg principles is felt in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid of 1973, and in many other international documents.

While talking about the significance of the Nuremberg principles one cannot fail to mention that the UN General Assembly at his 32nd Session resumed the discussion of a draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind after it was adjourned in 1954.

The consolidation of the Nuremberg principles as the principles of common interna-

tional law was an important event in the progressive development of international law. It signified the appearance of a new institute of international law — international criminal responsibility of individuals for international crimes which is of a material significance for increasing the role of international law in securing peace.

The Nuremberg principles are a monument to the great struggle of peoples against the Nazi barbarity, a monument to all those who gave up their lives in this sacred struggle, and who fell victim to the Nazi obscurantism. The Nuremberg principles are a constant reminder of the necessity to be vigilant and not to give up for a moment the struggle for peace against the forces risking a new world war which would be thousand times more terrible than the previous one.

LEGAL CONTENT OF THE «ZONE OF PEACE» NOTION

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Summary

In connection with the preparation of a conference on the Indian Ocean to declare it a zone of peace the following questions are dealt with in the article: What is a possible legal content of the «zone of peace» notion? Is there any relation of this notion to the political and military detente and to the legal content of «demilitarization», «neutralization» and «nuclear-free zone» notions already known to international law? Is the establishment of a zone of peace in any region relevant to the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament?

Based on the analysis of original proposals on a zone of peace by the Republic of Sri Lanka, 26th UN General Assembly Resolution No. 2832 of December 16, 1971 (Declaration on the Proclamation of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace), materials and documents of the Conference of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe, 3rd UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, 5th Conference of Heads of States and Governments of Non-Aligned Countries, International Conference for Peace, Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, the International Conference for the Establishment of Zones of Peace in the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as of the legal content of «demilitarization», «neutralization» and «nuclear-free zone» notions, the author came to the following conclusions:

1. The «zone of peace» notion comprises two important interrelated component parts: provisions relating to inter-state relations, securing peace and international security, peaceful coexistence and non-alignment; and provisions relating to the reduction and elimination of the (nuclear and conventional) arms race and disarmament.

2. A zone of peace in a geographical sense consists of two mutually inseparable component parts: land and water territories of coastal and mainland states and air space over them; and the water space beyond the limits of territorial waters of coastal states and the air space over it.

3. As to its content the «zone of peace» notion is a unity of measures of regional political and military detente, as well as it is an important step in the direction of limiting the arms race and of disarmament.

4. The «zone of peace» notion is related not only to «demilitarization», «neutralization» and «nuclear-free zone» notions but includes some of the component parts of these notions.

5. The «zone of peace» notion is not and cannot be a total combination of these three notions or be identified with any of them as in its scope it is much broader than any of these three notions because it includes general policy legal rules and rules regulating basic freedoms of the high seas.

6. The «zone of peace» notion includes as a component part the freedom of the high seas and the possibility of doing other activities for peaceful purposes as recognized in international law.

7. Observance of a future international law regime of a zone of peace must be guaranteed by all nuclear powers (including all Great Powers).

The author suggests the following legal content for the «zone of peace» notion:

A zone of peace is a precisely defined geographical region including land and water territories of coastal and mainland states and the air space over them, as well as the sea and air space beyond the limits of territorial waters of coastal states, with a special conventionally established and guaranteed legal regime which, in particular, provides for:

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non-interference of states located within the zone of peace and also of states actively using its waters, into internal affairs of each other; respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual renunciation of use or threat of force, and settlement of disputes exclusively by peaceful means through negotiations in accordance with the UN Charter; complete elimination of colonial regime within the zone of peace and granting of independence to all peoples under foreign domination;

prohibition within the zone of peace of military political alliances directed against any state or group of states, of establishment of foreign military bases, of installation, production, testing and storage of nuclear weapons and other types of mass destruction weapons and of their delivery vehicles; ban on the deployment of land-based and sea-based strategic nuclear weapons and their components, land, air and sea means of support and control thereof as well as of delivery vehicles thereof in land, sea and air space of the zone of peace and at the sea bed;

withdrawal of states within the zone of peace from military political alliances and their accession to international treaties in force pertaining to nuclear weapons and other types of mass destruction weapons, to

the limitation of the arms race and disarmament; elimination within the zone of peace of existing foreign military bases and ban on the construction of new ones; complete demilitarization of the zone of peace sea bed beyond the 12-mile zone of coastal states;

ban on the use of the zone of peace as a theatre of military operations except for cases of exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the UN Charter;

freedom of sea and air navigation, of laying underwater cables and pipelines beyond the limits of territorial waters of coastal states, as well as exercise in the sea and air space of the zone of peace of other freedoms of the high seas and of other activities for peaceful purposes recognized in the UN Charter and in international law;

ban on entry-into the zone of peace of warships and military aircraft with nuclear weapons aboard;

limitation of conventional armaments of states within the zone of peace by the requirements of national defense;

firm international guarantees of nuclear powers, including all Great Powers, to the effect that the international law regime of the zone of peace will be strictly observed by all states.

ON THE RIGHT OF DISARMAMENT FORMATION

O. V. Bogdanov, Doctor of Law, Professor

The problem of disarmament has taken the most important place in modern international life. Its solution is rightfully considered as of a key importance for a radical improvement in international relations. A certain progress has already been achieved: first practical steps have been made on the road to disarmament. As applied to international law the carried out work has resulted in a set of rules on the matters of disarmament. A whole system of treaties and agreements on such matters has come to life. It is a new phenomenon not to be found in the history of international relations.

Such process is reflected in the international law science. Over the recent years the number of works on legal aspects of disarmament has sharply grown. The socialist international law science has left behind the bourgeois one in the study of legal questions of disarmament. Over the recent years quite a few works on this subject, including a number of major monographic studies, have been published. It is indicative that in our country these matters are considered not only in specialized monographs but they have an important place in serious collective studies, such as, e. g., a six-volume treatise of international law and various textbooks on international law.

The Western international law science is characterized by a different approach to the matters of disarmament. For a long time many bourgeois jurists tried to entirely ignore the matters of disarmament. Later on such an approach was mainly overcome. The

studies of various aspects of disarmament have been noticeably intensified in a number of Western countries (it is especially true of the USA). The matters of disarmament are often discussed at various international conferences of jurists. The International Law Association which addressed itself several times to these matters over the recent years may serve as an example. Nevertheless, the views of a number of Western jurists are still characterized by a tendency either to ignore as before or to minimize the importance of developing international law in this field.

The socialist international law science is dominated by the thesis that the principle of disarmament is being formed now in international law. The problem of the specific content of this principle and of the ways of its evolution is now drawing ever growing attention. The solution of this matter requires analysis of a number of international treaties.

First of all, it is necessary to analyse the relevant provisions of the UN Charter which have played a noticeable role in asserting the problem of disarmament in international law. They are somewhat concise but, nevertheless, important for the theory of international law. They are contained in Articles 11, 26 and 47 of the UN Charter. It should be kept in mind that they had been worked out when World War II was still on and, therefore, they could not provide for peculiarities of the way the problem of disarmament was put in the post-war period.

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It goes without saying that answers to many aspects of disarmament topical now cannot be found in the UN Charter.

The distinctive feature of UN Charter provisions lies in the fact that disarmament is mentioned as one of the major tasks set to the UN principal bodies in the field of maintaining peace in the world. The authority to solve the matters of disarmament has been clearly distributed between the General Assembly and the Security Council. There is a considerable interest in the terminology used in the Charter on the matters of disarmament. On the whole, the Charter provides the necessary legal base for the implementation of disarmament measures.

In its practical activities UN has given considerable attention to various aspects of the disarmament problem. It is especially true of General Assembly resolutions which have become important tools for forming the principles related to disarmament. The present time is characterized by the transformation of such principles into conventional ones. Treaties have definitely taken the main place in this field: they do regulate the most important aspects of the disarmament problem.

The presence of a whole system of such kind of international law instruments transforms a set of principles and rules on disarmament into a certain branch of international law. One cannot fail to see that this branch assumes ever more distinctive forms. There is already in existence a number of major international treaties on the matters of disarmament. Further development must bring in new instruments of such kind. All this witnesses to the effect that disarmament is a branch in the development of international law. It is probably early to talk about this branch as fully formed. It would be more correct to say that it is in the stage of its active formation, with this process going at a more rapid pace.

The content of the disarmament principle at this stage comes to the commitment taken by many states to facilitate the implementation of already concluded agreements on disarmament and to elaborate as soon as possible new measures in this direction both of partial and more radical nature.

Such notions as the principle of disarmament, on the one hand, and the right of disarmament, on the other, should not be mixed up. The said principle forms in general the obligations of states in the field of di-

sarmament and represents the totality of treaties and rules in force in this field. The right of disarmament is, of course, much broader and more specific in its content than the principle of disarmament.

The right of disarmament is constantly developing. Hence, the principle of disarmament is also developing. As for the general direction of such development it should be said that it follows the line of an ever broader coverage of various types of armaments and of the ban (sometimes, complete, i. e., including destruction) of the most dangerous varieties of weapons. Such a direction must eventually lead to a general and complete disarmament, and then the principle of disarmament will be filled with a more radical and far-reaching content. But this stage is still ahead. So far the next turn is for the application of the system for limiting and banning individual types of modern weaponry. The abolition of armaments (i. e., general and complete disarmament) is the most important task of the future, the ultimate aim of the entire development in this field.

Sometimes there is a certain ambiguity in the assertion that the principle of disarmament has been formed. It is correct in the sense that such principle already exists. But it should not be interpreted in the sense of giving such evolution a tinge of finality as such formation is far from being completed — it is developing and intensifying. It is important to avoid a simplified interpretation of the international law evolution course in the field of disarmament.

One of peculiarities of legal regulation in the field of disarmament lies in the fact that its practical implementation requires an appropriate international treaty. Disarmament measures are simply impossible without such a treaty to regulate the procedure and specifically denote the objects subject to destruction. It applies both to the field of partial disarmament and to the programme of complete disarmament.

These are some of the questions on disarmament which arise in the theory of international law. There may be no doubt that the number of such questions will grow with the development of practical activities in the field of disarmament. It is another manifestation of a progressive development in international law and of making it an increasingly more effective tool of peace.

ON BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS

S. A. Tarasenko

Summary

The struggle in the field of banning and abolishing weapons of mass destruction is one of the most important directions in the struggle of the USSR for disarmament.

The problem of international legal ban on chemical means of mass extermination has an important place in the complex of

problems connected with the ban on all types of mass destruction weapons.

Chemical weapons are certainly inhuman as their enormous killing power is directed primarily and mainly against human beings as well as against every living creature on earth.

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Attempts at using chemicals in combat operations have their roots in ancient times. However, chemicals are considered to become real weapons of mass extermination at the beginning of the 20th century when they were actively used during World War I. The experiences of that war rather convincingly proved to the whole world a barbaric nature of such weapons what, undoubtedly, played a certain role in the process of making a rule putting a ban on these means of conduct of war.

The practice of using poisoned weapons in war has long been alien to the legal conscience of mankind. There is a well-known provision made back by Roman lawyers and later more clearly regulated to the effect that wars are fought with weapons and not with poison.

However, while being important international document the Geneva Protocol has only solved in part the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons. It does not prohibit the development, improvement and stockpiling of such weapons what is quite dangerous.

Today the bacteriological weapons are the only kind of mass destruction weapons completely banned by international law.

The question of a complete ban by international law on chemical means of mass extermination is now in the order of the day.

The Soviet Union advocates a radical solution to this question, i. e., the necessity of a comprehensive ban on chemicals of the types and in the quantities not justified by peaceful purposes. This conception is reflected in the draft convention prohibiting the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction proposed by socialist countries and submitted to the Disarmament Committee in March 1972.

However, not all capitalist countries expressed their readiness for a comprehensive ban by making proposals on a partial or gradual ban based on the criterion of toxicity. It allows to legalize such chemicals as defoliants, herbicides or irritating gases which were widely used by the US military in Vietnam and Cambodia.

At the present time there are discussions under way both within the Disarmament Committee and on a bilateral basis between the USSR and the USA with the aim to elaborate a mutually acceptable agreement.

There are considerable difficulties in coming to an agreement on the forms and methods of control. Thus, the USA and some other capitalist countries continue to strive at an unjustifiably broad set of measures of international character, including on-site inspections. It naturally slows down the pace of negotiations and does not contribute to their successful conclusion.

However, as it was noted in the statement on the results of the ninth round of negotiations which took place in February—March 1979, meetings between the USSR and the US delegations were helpful. Besides, the majority of representatives of states in the Disarmament Committee supports a comprehensive approach when solving the problem of the ban. All this gives hope that the elaboration of an agreement prohibiting chemical means of mass extermination would be crowned with a success and, thus, the mankind would be free forever from catastrophic consequences of a chemical war.

The second half of the 19th century saw the beginning of the process to legally regulate permissible means of conduct of war.

One of the first international law rules directly mentioning chemical weapons is contained in the provision of the Hague Convention IV on the laws and customs of war on land of 1907. It deals with the prohibition to «use poison or poisoned weapons». Later on such prohibitions began to appear in some other international treaties and agreements. However, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare is the basic document containing rules of mandatory nature with regard to prohibiting the use of chemicals in military operations.

The Geneva Protocol is a vivid example of codification and progressive development of international law in the field of the laws and customs of war. At the same time it has remained up to now as the most authoritative document containing the international law rule prohibiting the use of chemical means of mass extermination. The great importance of the Protocol lies also in the fact that it contains a like-wise prohibition with regard to bacteriological weapons.

MERCENARISM: AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME

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Summary

Mercenarism — a shameful manifestation of imperialism — is thoroughly analysed in the article on the basis of a rich factual material.

The authors review national legislations of mercenary supplying countries — the USA, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the FRG and Sweden. unmask the

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practice of mercenarism, and evaluate this phenomenon from the point of view of the existing system of international law.

In all mercenary supplying countries there are legal rules which make it possible to take measures against «the soldiers of fortune» and their recruiters, and it may seem that the illegality of mercenarism raises no doubts from the point of view of domestic legislations. But these laws have never been applied as imperialist states need mercenaries to fight against national-liberation movements and progressive independent states. On the contrary, there were attempts to apply these laws in respect of volunteers coming to help peoples to defend their right to self-determination.

A considerable attention is given to the legal analysis of mercenarism and volunteers. Based on existing international law the authors show the lawfulness of volunteers' actions what under the conditions of modern international law means assistance to a victim of aggression and to a national-liberation movement.

Nowadays, there is an argument in the Western literature on the definition of mercenarism. There are views to the effect that mercenarism is hard to define in general and, therefore, it is impossible to ban or somehow qualify it.

The authors give a criticizing analysis of findings of the Lord Diplock Commission (UK) which came to the conclusion on the impossibility to draw a line between a mercenary and a volunteer. Such an approach is an attempt to justify mercenaries and mercenarism. There are instruments of international law (the Hague Convention on the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land of 1907, the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of 1949, the Additional Protocol relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of June 10, 1977, the UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, etc.) which directly qualify mercenarism and mercenaries as an international crime and international criminals, and volunteers as lawful combatants.

For example, Article 47 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, concluded on June 10, 1977, treats mercenarism as an international crime and the mercenary as an individual not entitled to a combatant or prisoner-of-war status. The mercenary is defined as any individual who is specially recruited locally or abroad to fight in an armed conflict, directly participates in military actions being guided, primarily, by desire to obtain personal gains and who is actually promised by a party or on behalf of a party to a conflict a material recompense which is substantially higher than the recompense promised or paid to participants of military actions of the same rank and position making part of the military personnel of a given party. A mercenary is an individual

who is neither a national of a conflicting party nor a resident in the territory controlled by a conflicting party. A mercenary does not belong to the military personnel of a conflicting party nor he is sent by a state not being the party to a conflict to perform official duties as an individual belonging to its military personnel.

This definition gives the possibility to draw rather a clear line between a mercenary and a volunteer. In other words, it is the matter of individuals committing criminal offences and being subject to persecution and punishment.

Articles and studies by British, Belgian, African and American authors are analysed and criticized in this work.

The article analyses international law instruments in force related to mercenarism and mercenaries, shows its illegality and raises the point of the mercenaries' criminal responsibility.

The authors give a thorough analysis of draft Conventions on mercenaries prepared by OAU and the International Commission based on the first trial of mercenaries in Angola and analyse the trial itself of mercenaries in Luanda in 1976. States make efforts at the international level at establishing broad international law guarantees for combatting mercenarism and mercenaries. OAU has been very active in this matter.

During events in the Congo and the aggression against the Republic of Guinea in 1970, where mercenaries were used, the OAU Council of Ministers passed resolutions which qualified mercenaries as criminal offenders. By 1979 OAU adopted the Convention containing the definition of mercenaries and mercenarism. Mercenarism is considered to be a crime against peace and security in Africa and is punishable as such.

Under this Convention a mercenary is any individual who, while not being a national of the state against which his actions are directed, is hired, recruited or voluntarily allied himself with an individual, a group or an association whose aims are: to overthrow by armed violence or other means the government of an OAU member-state, to undermine the independence territorial integrity or normal operation of institutions of that state; or to block by any means the activities of any liberation movement recognized by OAU.

The Government of the People's Republic of Angola took and initiative to try mercenaries in Angola and the International Commission of Enquiry on Mercenaries was set up on a broad international basis. This Commission analysed the international practice of combatting mercenarism, of UN and OAU resolutions on this matter, and also worked out its own draft Convention.

While positively evaluating the approach of the draftsmen towards the definition of the mercenarism corpus delicti covered by the Convention and its more profound le-

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gal elaboration as compared to the OAU draft, it should be recognized that the draft has certain shortcomings. However, its main merit is in stimulating the legal elaboration of this matter and in mobilizing efforts to combat mercenarism.

Mercenaries should not only be outla-

wed in words but in reality. The road to this objective is the road of struggle against imperialism, the road of cooperation of peace-loving states in the international arena when solving every aspect of the problem, and the road of fighting all kinds of international crimes.

PECULIARITIES OF DRAWING UP TEXTS OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL TREATIES IN DIFFERENT LANGUAGES

V. I. Evintov

Summary

A contemporary international treaty has as a rule two or more equally authentic texts in different languages. The procedure for working out and concluding treaties should provide for conditions to draw up adequate and equally authentic texts in different languages.

As a rule, bilateral treaties are worked out simultaneously in the languages of the parties and recognized by them as equally authentic. Even if for any reason (e. g., lack of time) texts in the languages of the parties are not prepared at the same time the recognition of the two texts by the parties as authentic makes them equally reliable sources for determining the intentions and wills of the parties when interpreting them.

The most serious problems arise in the elaborations of general multilateral treaties on the matters of interest to the entire community of states. Therefore, their universality — the possibility and necessity of participation by the largest possible number of states — is of a special importance. The attainment of universality is facilitated by their elaboration in diplomatic languages accepted in the practice of the UN General Assembly and used by the majority of world population in countries belonging to different socio-economic systems and having different law systems.

The experience of working out texts in different languages of the UN Charter and the Final Act of the Conference in Helsinki in 1975, has shown that the elimination of possible discrepancies in the texts of a multilanguage treaty depends to a considerable extent on the way how these texts are prepared: simultaneously or first in one language with a subsequent translation into the others. A conclusion is made in the article to the effect that the greatest adequacy of texts may be reached if every provision under question is put into an appropriate language form at the very consideration of legal notions, opinions and situations with a subsequent comparison of the texts. The authenticity of texts presupposes that each of them is an independent reflection of all provisions of a treaty and at the same time it is fully equivalent to the others as to its legal effect.

Having studied the procedure of dra-

wing up and concluding international treaties with texts in two or more languages a conclusion may be drawn that this procedure has its own peculiarities related to the existence of different-language texts in a treaty. The practice of elaborating texts of these treaties and of concluding them has developed in the direction of taking more into account specific features of such kind of treaties. As a rule, texts of treaties in different languages are prepared without a time gap and without giving an advantage to any one «basic» text. In the course of drawing up texts in different languages more attention is given to compare in parallel the texts of treaties (as a rule multilanguage ones) especially of a general nature. States realize well enough that they are bound by the texts of a treaty in other languages as well. It should be noted that as there are no international law rules regulating the choice of languages for the preparation of treaty texts, the practice follows the Rules of Procedure of the UN General Assembly — a universal organization which elaborated and developed basic procedural forms for drawing up texts of multilanguage treaties. Having been developed in a difficult diplomatic and political struggle these forms are of a general democratic nature and they presuppose equal treatment of texts in major world diplomatic languages. It is reflected in the requirement for all texts in different languages to pass the same procedural stages of their preparation and simultaneous conclusion.

International law has also accumulated certain experience, unique of its kind, of concluding equally authentic texts of an international treaty in different languages with a big time gap. The experience of two diplomatic Conferences for adopting new equally authentic texts of the Chicago Convention of 1944 allows to state that the establishment of such procedural norms which would fix identical wills of the parties with regard to all texts of a treaty is one of the main conditions for adopting full-bodied and equally authentic texts. Being an exception from the rule, the ICAO experience is of a great importance as it brings to light certain specific ways of preparing and adopting multilanguage treaties.

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HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
OF DISARMAMENT PROBLEM (1946—1955)

G. A. Smirnov

Summary

The first ten years after World War II (1946—1955) is the most fruitless period of negotiations on disarmament which revealed two diametrically opposed policies: the policy of the USSR and all peace-loving forces towards a genuine disarmament, banning of atomic weapons, and reduction of armed forces, on the one hand, and the policy of the USA and other Western powers which sabotaged any concrete approach to solving the problem of disarmament, i. e., the policy aimed at whipping up the arms race, on the other.

A special study of this period of negotiations on disarmament is topical now as it is not by chance that the history of negotiations after World War II, especially its early period, is so much distorted and confused by the Western propaganda and diplomacy. The role of the UN Charter in the field of disarmament is played down and the presence of the principle of disarmament in the Charter as one of main principles of modern international law is denied. It is being done in the interests of those who bear the blame for unleashing a wild arms race and for making the discussion of the disarmament problem during many years to look like a fencing match rather than a business-like consideration. Many versions by the Western historians and international jurists of this problem have nothing to do with reality, and they are aimed at confusing all those who want to understand why the atomic age has brought with it a tragedy and threat to all mankind and why the hopes of peoples for cooperation among anti-Hitlerite coalition powers embodied in the UN Charter, and for a better and safer world have not come true. While not being able to deny the historical responsibility evident to everybody which is carried in its entirety by the USA for «letting the atomic jinn out of the jar», some US propagandists want to shift the attention to later events and to cast a shadow over the USSR policy. But the facts are against those who started and whipped up the arms race. They are against the latter-day «theorists» from Peking who are also fussing about the concept of equal «responsibility» by the USSR and imperialist powers for the arms race. If in 1946 the USA and other Western powers had accepted the Soviet proposal to ban atomic weapons the world would not have lived now under the terrible threat of nuclear war. If they had agreed to embark on the road of reducing the armed forces and armaments following appeals by the USSR

the world would not have been in a frenzy of uncontrollable competition in weaponry.

The origin of the atomic bomb and the circumstances of its first use serve as a clear evidence of the fact that the US ruling circles pinned rather far-reaching expectations on atomic weapons. The entire US foreign policy was subjected to the objective of maintaining the strategic military edge in the form of atomic weapons, their delivery vehicles and military bases spread throughout the world. It was the very reason for a negative attitude by the USA to the USSR proposals on the ban on atomic weapons and on the general reduction of armaments. It was the reason why the USA clung so hard to the Baruch Plan which contradicted the UN Charter, knowing in advance that there were no prospects to force it upon the USSR, and put a decision through the United Nations, using the voting machine it had then at its disposal, declaring this Plan as the UN Plan.

A number of UN General Assembly resolutions unanimously adopted in 1946—55 (taking particular account of their numerous reaffirmations) reflected the practice of recognizing the principle of disarmament which was fixed in the UN Charter as a universally recognized principle of modern international law. Although the presence of the general principle of disarmament in the UN Charter does not imply a ban on having this or that type of weaponry, on the whole, the whipping up of the arms race runs counter to this principle of modern international law.

The USSR proposals tabled at that time were fully consistent with such main principles of contemporary international law set forth in the UN Charter as the principles of sovereign equality of states, political independence and territorial inviolability, and non-interference into internal affairs of states (Art. 2, UN Charter).

The Soviet diplomacy never gave up trying to get moving the negotiations on nuclear disarmament, on the reduction of conventional arms and the armed forces even at the times when it seemed there was not the slightest chance of success. Such consistent, tenacious and principled policy of the USSR has successfully led from confrontation to business-like discussions starting from the 60's and to reaching agreements in a number of fields related to reducing the nuclear war threat, limiting the arms race, and to disarmament.

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NIHILISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (ITS GENESIS AND CONTEMPORANEITY)

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Summary

Nihilism in international law continues to play an important role in contemporary ideological struggle, while some questions on the origin and development of international law nihilism have not been sufficiently studied so far. The problem of origin of international law nihilism is the subject of this article.

Hobbes and Spinoza are usually considered to be the fathers of international law nihilism. It is true that at the beginning nihilism was expressed in the most complete form in their views on international law which have their own earlier roots as they originated back in the midst of feudal socio-economic formation.

The roots of nihilistic doctrine in the sphere of international law and its science stem from the idealistic platform of Thomas Aquinas, on the one hand, and Machiavellianism, on the other. The essential facets of the latter are the basic core of all nihilistic political and legal doctrines. Thus, in difference to the established point of view, Thomas Aquinas and Machiavelli should be recognized as proclaimers of nihilism in international law. Although due to immaturity of international law and of its science the views of these authors related only to some individual matters and their doctrines were not rather clearly defined and well-balanced, they, nevertheless, laid the theoretical foundation to nihilistic attacks on international law.

Of course, the views of T. Hobbes and B. Spinoza, two greatest thinkers at the time of break-up of the feudal system, who had a nihilistic attitude towards legal determinations in the sphere of international relations, are of a special significance in the history of nihilism in international law.

In fact, Hobbes gave start to the negation of significance of regulating international relations by treaties and disclaimed in general the validity of international treaties.

Nihilistic views were treated in a greater detail in the political and legal teachings of Spinoza. Doubt as to the possibility of ensuring the fulfilment of international obligations in good faith is the basic thesis which is literally a key-note in Spinoza's teachings. Spinoza stated the right of every state to withdraw from honouring obligations under treaties by saying that the withdrawal should not be blamed on the state.

Thus, the nihilistic conception found its reflection in the conceptions of Hobbes and Spinoza. It was also characteristic for the views of S. Pufendorf, C. Wolf and others. In the then specific historical environment the international law nihilism of these authors had known objective premises. The appearing bourgeois class through its ideologists repudiated the then existing positive

feudal law which was in its essence a «list» law, what found its expression in the attitude towards international law then in force which held down business activities of bourgeoisie beyond the boundaries of national states.

With the consolidation of its positions the bourgeoisie forgot about earlier proclaimed by it «natural rights» of peoples and embarked on the road of their gross violation by giving a different form to nihilism in international law. The revival of international law nihilism on a new soil and its full blossom falls on the 1870's, i. e., on the age of imperialism. Reactionary interpreters of Hegel's teachings on domestic law, first of all, A. Lasson and then the Zorn brothers created before World War I a well-balanced structure of international law nihilism which had its followers in a whole number of imperialist countries. Every time, regardless of crushing blows which fell on the ideologists of international law nihilism, these theories seemed to receive a new impetus when some ruling circles of imperialist countries made preparations for an aggression. That is why the international law nihilism found such a fertile soil in Nazi Germany, that is why it is being cultivated in every way where acts of aggression are in preparation or take place — be it Israel or the SAR.

Even west-European and US universities are not short of sympathizers of international law nihilists.

Under the present-day conditions connected with the shift in the focus of the struggle between the two systems to non-military means there is no end to attempts at distorting the regulatory essence of international law and at interpreting it, while ignoring specific features of a given law system, as a purely instrumental subject conducive to the realization of basic class objectives of the bourgeois reactionary circles.

At the same time it is necessary to draw a clear line between the so-called «radical» nihilists (the most reactionary wing of international law negators) and the so-called «moderate» (liberal and pacifist) theoreticians who in constructing their conceptions aimed at solving key problems of humanity prepare a fertile soil for the negation of international law due to their class narrow-mindedness and narrowness of their methodological base.

The power of international law nihilism to survive is the reason for the topicality and significance of criticizing nihilistic doctrines and for the necessity of their more profound and thorough analysis in the light of the problems of contemporary ideological struggle.

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UNIFICATION OF MARITIME LAW AND THE NOTION
OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW*A. L. Makovsky, Candidate of Law*

Summary

Private international maritime law is a subdepartment of private international law which represents a civil law department of domestic law regulating property relationships with a foreign element and combining both domestic law conflict rules and direct and conflict rules unified by means of international agreements. This subdepartment differs from the other subdepartments of private international law in a large number of rules resulting from international unification.

The basic content of obligations assumed by states under international treaties on law unification consists of the duty of each of them to ensure legal regulation of relations specified in such a treaty in a manner established therein. This duty has a different content dependent on the methods of unification used in the treaty.

Under «indirect» unification the participating states in a treaty are committed to establish a legal rule in their legislations whose content is defined to this or that extent in that treaty. The provision of the treaty to establish such rules is the international law rule whence these very rules established in implementation of an international treaty are the rules of domestic law.

The «direct» unification method is the most characteristic one for the unification of maritime law whereby finalized legal rules (direct and, less frequently, conflict rules) are defined in an international treaty ready for application in domestic law systems of participating states in a treaty, and these states commit themselves to ensure their application. Such unified rules are of dual nature. On the one hand, they are already established and included in an international treaty as rules intended for application with the use of domestic mechanism in combination with other rules of municipal law. They are mainly civil law rules as to their nature. On the other hand, unified rules define the content of commitment made by the participants to an international treaty and may be considered as one of the elements of this treaty. This quality of unified rules explains their «conciliatory» nature as well as the application thereto of a number of treaty law provisions.

One may talk of the «mixed» unification method when unified rules are defined in an international treaty but at the same time the participants to a treaty are given the right to deviate therefrom in their legislations.

Putting an international treaty on the unification of maritime law in effect and the fulfilment of obligations assumed by its participants find their expression, first

of all, in the formation of domestic law of states corresponding to such treaty. Incidentally, all the matters of putting the said treaties into effect by participants thereto belong to the domain of legal correlation of international law and domestic law. Such correlation is determined by the fact that the state acting within the framework of one legal system must observe its binding requirements of another legal system and by that indication of the state's legal bond it is different from actual interaction (interinfluence) of international law and domestic law.

The transformation of treaty provisions on law unification into municipal law rules of the contracting state is an act of law-making which can be performed in only one of the two ways—either through creation by the state of rules of its law or through sanctioning by the state (i. e., by giving legal force to the already formed rules of conduct). The first way is required at indirect unification of law, and the second one—at direct unification. At mixed unification the one or the other method is used to put a treaty into effect depending on whether the state intends to use the right to deviate from unified rules. The act of assuming obligations under a relevant treaty (ratification, accession, etc.) is the basic form of sanctioning unified rules by the state.

International treaties on the unification of law of states with different socio-political systems aim primarily at uniform regulation of relations with the foreign element and to the extent possible they do not bind the contracting state in the matters relating to the regulation of relations not exceeding the framework of its legal system. But for practical reasons the sphere of action of such treaties never covers with absolute exactness the sphere of a certain kind of relations with the foreign element: some portion of such relations turns out to be outside of the treaty action, whereas some purely «internal» relations are involved in its sphere. By incorporating treaty provisions in its law the contracting state is bound by the sphere of their action defined in the treaty. It cannot diminish this sphere but it may expand it by applying its rules established as a result of international unification of law to «internal» relations if there are no objective obstacles to that.

Domestic law rules resulting from the international unification of law have a special place in domestic law not only from the point of view of the sphere of their action but also due to their legal force in the hierarchy of legal rules of a given state. The participating state in an

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international treaty on law unification commits itself to ensure the regulation of relations defined in such a treaty in a manner established therein irrespective of the manner in which these relations are regulated by its own law. Such commitment brings solution to the problem of conflict of thus created rules with the other rules of law of such state requiring the recognition of priority of the rules resulting from unification.

There is no unambiguous answer to the question of whether it is possible to consider an international treaty on law unification as a source of domestic law. If the direct unification method is used such a treaty may be considered as a source of domestic law of the state in the formal sense. It is more difficult to answer the

question on the source of law in material sense. In case of indirect unification and in case of the mixed unification method (if the state uses the option to deviate from the text of the unified rule) a complex combination of the common will by the party to an international treaty and the will of the state creating a legal rule in accordance with the treaty provisions, is such a source of law. In case of direct unification it seems necessary to distinguish between a will defining the content of unified rules and a will giving them a quality of domestic law. In the former case it is the common will of the parties to a treaty which forms a unified rule, and in the latter case it is the will of each state participating in a treaty taken separately.

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA, 1978

G. G. Ivanov, Candidate of Law

Summary

A new convention was approved in Hamburg on March 30, 1978,—the United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978, (the Hamburg Rules) which is designed to replace the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading, 1924 (the Hague Rules) and the Protocol to amend the said Convention, 1968 (the Visby Rules).

The criticism of the Hague Rules was caused by two main reasons. The first one related to the sphere of commercial activity and was connected with the shortcomings of the 1924 Convention itself and with the necessity to adjust it to new conditions of carriage. The second reason, which belonged to the political sphere and played a decisive role, was connected with the appearance in the world arena of a large number of developing countries who did not participate in the creation of the Hague Rules and thought that the regime established in the past to regulate interrelations between developed countries was no longer applicable for regulating relations between developed and developing countries or even between developing countries.

A new draft convention, prepared at the request of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), was considered at its ninth session in 1976 and brought for consideration to the international conference which took place in Hamburg in 1978.

The 1978 Convention consists of 34 articles and is composed of seven Parts. Its sphere of application has been considerably broadened: it applies to all contracts of carriage irrespective of the fact whether they are evidenced by the bill of lading, other document or are not evidenced by a

special document at all (carriage by a charter-party is the only exception). The Convention is applicable to all contracts of carriage between different states if the port of loading or the port of discharge is located in a contracting state as well as in the case if the bill of lading or other document is issued in a contracting state. The carrier's period of responsibility is also extended: it includes all the time during which the carrier is in charge of the goods at the port of loading, during the carriage and at the port of discharge. It should be noted that some provisions of the «period of responsibility» are not sufficiently clear.

The basic rule of carrier's liability is formulated in paragraph 1 of article 5. According to this rule the carrier is liable for loss resulting from loss of or damage to the goods, as well as from delay in delivery, if the occurrence which caused the loss, damage or delay took place while the goods were in his charge, unless the carrier proves that he, his servants or agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences. Unlike the 1924 Convention, the rule of the carrier's liability is formulated in a positive form and there is no approximate list of occurrences (including the so called «navigational error») freeing the carrier from liability. The principle of liability for fault is formulated in this rule without a sufficient precision and it required to adopt a special «Common Understanding» as Annex II to the Final Act of the Conference under which the liability of the sea carrier is based on the principle of «presumed fault». There are only two exceptions from the general rule which are contained in paragraphs 4 and 6, while the rule of paragraph 4 (liability in case of fire) differs only in

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the distribution of the burden of proof. Under paragraph 6 the carrier is not liable in those cases where damage was caused as a result of measures to save life. However a new approach is applied to saving property by introducing an additional criterion of reasonable measures.

The liability of the carrier has a certain limit whose amount is calculated on the basis of a dual criterion—per package or per kilogramme of gross weight, whichever is the higher. The Special Drawing Right serves as the unit of account, however, states which are not members of the International Monetary Fund may use Poincare francs. The right of the carrier to the limitation of liability is «indestructible» to the maximum extent, although he may be denied it if it is proved that the loss, damage or delay in delivery resulted from an act or omission of the carrier done with the intent to cause the damage or recklessly and with the knowledge that such damage would probably result. Unlike the Hague Rules, the Hamburg Rules directly provide for two cases when the carrier may be denied the right to the limitation of liability: at the carriage of goods on deck if the parties expressly agreed for carriage under deck, and if the carrier includes in the bill of lading false information with the intent to defraud a third party.

Servants or agents of the carrier (including such independent subcontractors as stevedores and terminal operators) are also entitled to the limits of liability if they prove that they acted within the scope of their employment.

Under article 10, if the carrier entrusted the performance of the carriage or part thereof to another person, the carrier nevertheless remains responsible for the entire carriage and he is responsible for the acts and omissions of the actual carrier, his servants or agents. The so called «through carriage» is the only exception (article 11), where the carrier may be released from liability only in the case if

he (1) provides explicitly in the contract that a specified part of the carriage is performed by a person other than the carrier; (2) provides the name of a person performing that part of the carriage; (3) proves that the occurrence causing the damage took place while the goods were in the charge of the actual carrier. Regardless of serious drawbacks, for the first time in private international maritime law article 11 «legalizes» the existence of through carriage and gives the opportunity to carriers to continue this commercial practice, although, under the conditions less favorable for the parties.

The general rule of the liability of the shipper (article 12) is formulated in a somewhat different way as compared with the rule of the carrier's liability.

For the first time the Hamburg Rules make an attempt at solving the problem of letters of guarantee. Under paragraph 2 of article 17 any letter of guarantee or agreement by which the shipper undertakes to indemnify the carrier against loss resulting from the issuance of the bill of lading by the carrier, or by a person acting on his behalf, without entering a reservation relating to particulars furnished by the shipper, or to the apparent condition of the goods, is void and of no effect as against a third party to whom the bill of lading has been transferred. However, the rule formulated in paragraph 3, under which such letter is valid as against the shipper unless the carrier, by omitting the reservation, intends to defraud a third party, may give rise to serious difficulties.

The limitation period for all claims related to the carriage is increased from one to two years compared to the 1924 Convention. The Hamburg Rules (articles 21 and 22) contain provisions on the jurisdiction and arbitration which mark the renunciation of a long-established practice to solve the matters of jurisdiction of disputes on the basis of agreement between the parties.

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INTERNATIONAL

INTERNATIONAL TIES OF SOVIET INSTITUTE OF HISTORY

[Editorial Report] Moscow ISTORIYA SSSR in Russian No 3, May-June 1982, carries on pp 214-219 a 5300-word article titled "International Scientific Ties of the Institute of the History of the USSR of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR" by N. F. Bugay. The article describes the foreign contacts of Soviet historians between 1976 and 1980 and the published results of this form of scientific cooperation.

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NATIONAL

NEW BROMLEY ARTICLE ON CONTEMPORARY ETHNIC PROCESSES

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 82 pp 3-15

[Article by Yu. V. Bromley: "Main Trends of Ethnic Processes in Present-Day World"]

[Text] While it represents a single biological species evolving in accordance with common social laws, modern mankind at the same time is divided into a multiplicity of diverse historically evolved communities. They are, for example, race, class, family, state, etc. A special place among these human communities is occupied by formations now conventionally termed ethnic: tribe, folk, nationality, nation, people, etc. According to the most modest calculations, present-day mankind has inherited from the past at least 2,000 to 3,000 such communities which, moreover, differ markedly in level of development and numbers. These differences range from nationalities of ancient origin, or even tribes numbering as few as thousands or sometimes hundreds of members, on the one hand, to multi-million peoples, on the other. It is indicative that a mere 11 nations account for about one-half of all mankind. The seven largest nations have populations of more than 100 millions each. They are (in order of decreasing population, according to 1978 data): Chinese (934 million); Indians (180.5 million); Americans in the United States (172.2 million); Bengalis (138.7 million); Russians (138.6 million); Japanese (115.7 million); and Brazilians (112 million).¹ At the same time, some 1,500 small peoples with populations of up to 100,000 each account for less than 1 percent of the world's total population.

The non-uniformity of historical development of the world's peoples has distinctively affected the ethnopolitical structure of modern mankind. All the peoples inhabiting our planet dwell in a little more than 200 countries (states and territories). Hence, most present-day countries are multi-ethnic. As is well known, such countries exist both among the socialist countries (e.g. the USSR, Yugoslavia, Vietnam) and among the developed capitalist countries (Great Britain, Canada, Belgium). But it is the developing countries that are most often characterized by the diversity of their ethnic mix. For example, in India there exist several hundred different ethnic divisions and in Indonesia, at least 150 (or even more than 350 according to calculations by certain authors). As for Africa, current statistics show that more than 730 languages are spoken there. In Nigeria, for example, the official count of the different ethnic groups is 200 and in Kenya and Sudan, roughly up to 40 each, and so forth.

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It should also be borne in mind that the habitats of many peoples are subdivided among different states. The scale of this phenomenon is illustrated, in particular, by the following (1978) data: 58.3 percent of Albanians live in Albania; 34.8 percent, in Yugoslavia. Similarly, 59.8 percent of Pushtuns (Afghans) live in Pakistan and 39.9 percent, in Afghanistan. Or, 50.4 percent of Tajiks live in Afghanistan and 48.7 percent, in the USSR.²

The diversity of the ethnosocial or, more simply, national structure of modern mankind makes particularly complex the development and interaction of the ethnosocial, national features. This process evolves differently in different social milieux--under socialism and under capitalism. The class antagonisms existing under capitalism inevitably engender ethnosocial antagonisms. This phenomenon, which had already been perceived by the founders of Marxism, is particularly evident in the modern capitalist world, of which international conflicts are so characteristic. This alone makes particularly significant the study of the present-day ethnosocial processes which at present operate among the prime factors in the social development of mankind.

Of fundamental importance to understanding these processes is V. I. Lenin's concept of two tendencies of the nationalities' question under capitalism. As he pointed out in this connection, "developing capitalism is familiar with two historic tendencies of the nationalities' question. First, the awakening of national life and national movements, the struggle against all ethnic oppression, and the founding of national states. Second, the development and growth of all relations among nations, the breakdown of barriers among nations, the development of international unity of capital as well as of the unity of economic life in general, politics, science, etc."³

These two tendencies, in the final analysis, are among the manifestations--in the social sphere--of a more general law--the law of the dialectical unity of the integrating and the differentiating principles.

These two tendencies manifest themselves throughout world history,⁴ but their operation becomes particularly intense with the advent of capitalism. It manifests itself, on the one hand, in the formation and development of the main ethnosocial subdivisions of the era--nations and, on the other, in the growth of their mutual ties, i.e. in internationalization.⁵ This law also is uncovered by V. I. Lenin's concept of two tendencies in the nationalities' question whose unity represents, as he had stressed, the "worldwide law of capitalism."⁶

In the presence of a general crisis of capitalism these tendencies become further intensified. This especially concerns the tendency toward internationalization in the sphere of economics. The general crisis of capitalism has, in particular, expedited the evolution of monopoly capital into state-monopoly capital, thereby contributing to a further amalgamation of production. The internationalist trend has also manifested itself in the broader development--on the basis of the scientific and technological revolution--of the mass media (from transport to radio and television).

Foreign trade is growing at a vigorous pace. Exports of capital increase at an even faster rate. During the 1945-1975 period the long-range foreign investments by the

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major imperialist countries soared roughly tenfold and reached US\$580 billion. But an even higher record, perhaps, was broken by the international commercial exchange of technologies, patents, and licenses. Its average annual growth rate has even overtaken the rate of export of entrepreneurial capital.⁷ International co-production has increased in scale. Such a form of the internationalization of modern capital as the multinational corporations (MNC) has developed extensively.⁸

A special form of the internationalization of economic life under present-day conditions is economic integration. Underlying it are the objective needs of the development of productive forces, the steadily closer interaction among the economies of discrete countries, and the steadily deeper interweaving of their production processes and regulation of mutual relations among these countries. Depending on the socio-economic conditions that prevail, economic integration has its own forms specific of the system of society concerned, and its own traits and features, which cause socialist and capitalist integrations to be fundamentally different.⁹

But inter-imperialist relations are governed not only by the integrative, unifying tendency but also by a tendency "opposing some imperialists to others."¹⁰ The former is engendered by the unity of the class interests of the world bourgeoisie and the latter, by its inevitable economic mutual competition. The late 1940s as well as the 1950s and 1960s were years of predominance of the "unifying" tendency, which resulted in the birth of NATO and of the complex whole of military, political, and economic agreements uniting most of the developed capitalist countries. In the first half of the 1970s the operation of the second tendency, and of the centrifugal processes it engenders, became intensified.¹¹

On the whole, however, on the scale of the entire capitalist world, the differentiating tendency manifests itself chiefly in that "among the various imperialist powers ... the non-uniformity of economic development gets intensified."¹²

Thus while in mid-twentieth century the internationalist tendency still predominated in the developed capitalist countries, in the developing countries the predominant tendency was that characterized by V. I. Lenin as "the awakening of national life and national movements."¹³ A special expansion was experienced by the national-liberation movement of the colonial and semi-colonial nations and dependent countries following World War II. As a result, thus while on the eve of that war these countries had accounted for 66 percent of the world's population, now colonies account for less than 1 percent. Having accomplished in the main the tasks of national liberation, the peoples of the young states have faced the need to promote their economic and cultural development. The center of gravity of national life has chiefly shifted to the socio-economic sphere. A number of countries took the path of noncapitalist development, the path of socialist orientation.

The liberated countries strive to put an end to the legacy of colonialism, to direct and indirect exploitation by the imperialist countries. To this end, above all, they are taking control of their own natural resources.¹⁴

The liberated countries increasingly develop cooperation with the countries of the socialist community, which plays a decisive role in the struggle of the young

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states for economic independence. This cooperation is based on community of anti-imperialist objectives and support of the socialist countries for the efforts of the young states to consolidate their sovereignty and develop an independent economy. The scale of cooperation with the Soviet Union is steadily growing. Thus, the volume of economic and technical assistance by the USSR to the developing countries has increased in 1977 by a factor of 6.2 percent compared with 1960, of which by a factor of 5.5 as regards Asian countries and 8.3 as regards African countries.¹⁵

The expansion of the economic ties of the liberated countries intensifies the tendency toward exacerbation of inter-imperialist contradictions. This is most notably reflected in the complication of contradictions between the United States, on the one hand, and France, the FRG, and other EEC countries, on the other. Along with factors of a constant nature (such as the competition for influence in Africa, Arab countries, and a number of regions in Latin America), other major factors are the differing degree of dependence on imports of crude oil and other types of raw materials, the--on the whole--more extensive ties between the economies of the West European countries and those of the developing countries, the lower economic potential of West European capitalism compared with its North American counterpart, etc.

Along with the socio-economic sphere, the effect of the two tendencies considered has also manifested itself in the domain of culture. This is most graphically reflected in the so-called mass culture, whose functioning under capitalism is of an extremely contradictory nature. On the one hand, it tends to break down national barriers, and it would clearly be an oversimplification to disregard this, since, like the unity of economic life, culture--as propagated by the mass media--contributes to breaking down the isolation of cities and regions which as late as 100 years ago had lacked regular mutual ties. "It has brought along awareness of what is happening in the world, supplanting provincial boredom, brawls, bear-baiting, and public executions which had until then, along with religious holidays, provided sole entertainment for the masses for many centuries.¹⁶ On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that in the capitalist world "mass culture is utilized to regularly manipulate public awareness, to promote conformism, and to standardize and primitivize spiritual life.¹⁷ At the same time, mass media are widely used by the imperialist powers to impose on other nations reactionary views, tastes, behavior stereotypes, and models and imprints of culture.¹⁸

The tendency toward the internationalization of spiritual life, which in the capitalist world assumes chiefly forms of "mass culture," is even now, however, combined with the tendency toward differentiation. The latter manifests itself, in particular, in the rebirth of interest in traditional legacies of national culture as a valued national heritage, in the creation of ethnically distinctive professional works of art, and in the combination of indigenous cultural components with standardized mass components. The social-class differentiation of culture persists and is largely deepening. This is particularly characteristic of ideology; in this respect the positions of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are deeply antagonistic toward one another.

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The non-uniform rate of the socio-economic development of the world's countries under the conditions of capitalism has resulted in a great diversity of ethnic processes and their rates, types, and varieties. A major role in the development of these processes is played by the ethnic input parameters of the peoples on whose basis they develop. It is one matter when this basis is represented by a nation or even a nationality, and it is another when several nationalities are involved, and still another when not only nationalities but tribes are involved. The importance of the ethnopolitical structure of the state also is great.

In monoethnic (single-nation) states usually the basic processes are those of intra-ethnic consolidation, i.e. merger into a larger ethnic grouping owing to the smoothing of differences among the discrete component ethnographic groups and subgroups. The scale, depth, and rate of these processes largely depend on the level of a nation's socio-economic development, and even in the developed capitalist countries these processes often still are under way. Thus, there still exist tangible differences of an dialectal and ethnocultural nature between the German subethnic groups in the FRG and GDR: Bavarians, Saxons, Hessians, Mecklenburgers, etc. In a sense, the consolidation of the Italians still remains incomplete as their genetic kin, the Friul and Ladin (Rhaeto-Romanic) peoples which also live in Italy still continue to merge with them.

The Chinese may provide an example of a far from complete ethnic consolidation of peoples of ancient origin. Thus, the dwellers of northern China do not understand southerners. The unified system of hieroglyphic [ideographic] writing serves as a means of mutual communication.

Extremely active processes of ethnoconsolidation are under way in many developing countries that have recently become liberated from colonial dependence. There, these processes are not only intra-ethnic but also inter-ethnic. In some cases, these processes already have led to the rise of new ethnic communities. Thus, the mergers of affine ethnic groups in Kenya have led to the rise of the Nilotic Luo people (about 2.2 million) and in Tanzania, the Niambezi nationality (about 3.7 million). A similar phenomenon is observed in Nigeria, where the consolidation of kin groups into the Ibo nationality (about 13.3 million) proceeds at a rapid pace. Analogous though somewhat less advanced processes take place in the People's Republic of Congo where, according to certain forecasts, a consolidation on the nationwide scale of the numerous kin (Bantusi) ethnic groups (about 70) is to be expected.

Special mention should be made of the so-called processes of ethnogenetic mixing--the rise of new peoples owing to the mergers of various unrelated ethnic groups. Extremely interesting in this respect is the process of the formation of the Anglo-Canadian people resulting from the mixing of settlers from Great Britain. The point is that initially it was the Irish (40 percent) rather than the English (33 percent) who had predominated among these settlers.²⁰ A particularly large number of examples of present-day ethnogenetic mixing is provided by Latin America, and these examples are extremely graphic as well, since there, as a rule, representatives of varied ethnoracial groups are taking part in the formation of new ethnic nationalities, so that this formation is accompanied by racial mixing. For example,

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in El Salvador, where the mixing of individuals of European origin (Creoles) and Indians has been continuing for more than two centuries, early in the nineteenth century the mestizos (Ladinos) accounted for 54 percent of the country's population while in the 1930s their share exceeded 75 percent and at present it is more than 90 percent. A similar picture is observed in Honduras, where at present the Ladinos account for 91 percent of the country's population; Indians, 6 percent; blacks, 2 percent; and whites, 1 percent. At the same time, in many countries of Latin America the process of ethnoracial mixing is still relatively far from being completed. Thus in Guatemala the Spanish-speaking population (chiefly a mixed population) accounts for only about one-half of the country's inhabitants.²¹

Processes of racial and, along with it, ethnic mixing are characteristic of many other countries as well. But their rate largely depends on the extent of discrimination practiced against various racial groups. In this sense, the example of the United States is perhaps the most indicative. There, according to the laws of certain states, a "Negro" is considered one who has at least one-eighth--and in some states even one-sixteenth, "Negro blood." Moreover, recently the category of "mulattoes" has in general disappeared from American statistics. However, calculations by experts show that as early as in the 1930s three-fourths of American Negroes were in reality mulattoes.²²

In all foreign countries, to one degree or another, processes of ethnic assimilation are under way; this especially pertains to multi-ethnic states, and, within these, to widely scattered ethnic groups, minorities, and immigrants. In the postwar period, as a rule, the number of immigrants has markedly increased in many industrial developed countries. Thus, in the FRG in the early 1960s there had been some 700,000 immigrants, while in the late 1970s their number grew to as many as 4 million. In West Europe as a whole at present there live at least 12 million immigrants. To a large extent, they are newcomers from the countries of the Mediterranean Basin, chiefly unskilled workers. Thus, in the FRG there are about 1 million Turks and 600,000 each of Yugoslavs and Italians. At the same time the number of immigrants from former colonies has increased. Particularly indicative in this respect is Great Britain where the postwar period witnessed the coming of large numbers of Negroes from the West Indies as well as of Indians and Pakistanis from former British possessions in South Asia and East Africa. (Despite the promulgation of various laws sharply restricting the influx of "colored" immigrants into England, their number in that country is rapidly rising owing to their high natural population increase: from 1 million in 1966 to about 2 million in 1980.)²³ The composition of the immigrants also is changing. Indicative in this respect is the United States. Thus while early in the twentieth century 90 percent of all newcomers originated from Europe, during 1950-1975 only 36.9 percent of the total influx was from Europe, with 46.2 percent of the remainder coming from other countries of the Americas and 15.1 percent from Asian countries.²⁴ In South East Asia a particularly large group of immigrants is represented by Chinese--the so-called huatsaos, who in many countries play an extremely active but far from always positive role (they number more than 20 million).²⁵

The course and rate of assimilation processes depend on a complex whole of factors: length of residence, occupation, ethnic origin, level and ethnic features of culture of the country immigrated into, its racial structure, degree of discrimination against immigrants, and the spread of mixed marriages. In

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English-speaking countries (United States, Australia, Canada), children of immigrants from Great Britain can no longer be distinguished from the local population. The assimilation of immigrants from Central Europe in these countries is more difficult. Even in the presence of ethnically mixed marriages the process of the ethnic assimilation of such immigrants takes, as a rule, several generations. Indicative in this sense are the processes occurring in the United States where, on the eve of World War II, as many as 50 percent of all marriages in some regions were ethnically mixed, but nevertheless the present-day ethnic situation in the United States is characterized by the fact that a majority of the offspring of European immigrants, while considering themselves Americans, remember their ethnic origin.²⁶

A far from unambiguous situation exists with respect to racially mixed marriages. In such cases, the factor decisive to the rate of assimilation is the presence or absence of racial discrimination. In particular, the discrimination practices in the United States and Great Britain markedly impede the assimilation of "colored" immigrants. Conversely, the virtually total absence of discrimination in a number of Latin American countries has, as known, been extraordinarily conducive to the development of the processes of ethnic mixing, as mentioned before.

Owing to the extension of the processes of ethnic assimilation over a number of generations, as a result of the operation of various factors, immigrants—like other individuals subject to assimilation—not infrequently find themselves existing in a unique state of transition when their original ethnic ties are completely or nearly severed and their new ties are not yet consolidated. Foreign literature applies the term "marginal man" to such individuals, and Soviet literature has introduced the broader concept of the "transition group."²⁷

The "marginal men" of various generations often display definite differences in their standards and values. This not infrequently leads to conflicts in relations between the first generation of immigrants, which attempts to retain traditional ethnocultural values, and the second and third generations which strive to blend with the ambient ethnosocial milieu. There arises the notion of the "old-fashioned" values of the older generation, and often also the desire to skirt them. "To this end, the second and third generations of immigrants may move to another region and even change a "foreign" name or transform it into a local-sounding name."²⁸

It must be stressed again that assimilation in foreign countries is far from always natural. In some cases, as pointed out earlier, it is impeded by ethnic and racial discrimination, while in others, conversely, it is "accelerated" by force. Mention should be made, in this connection, of the forced assimilation of ethnic minorities in the Chinese People's Republic.²⁹

Along with assimilation, another ethnic consequence of immigrations is the growth of the ethnic mosaic in many countries. In particular, owing to the tide of immigration, in the last 15 or so years the FRG has turned from a virtually mono-ethnic state (until 1960 the Germans accounted for more than 99 percent of its population) into a country with a complex ethnic composition: at present, it contains nine ethnic groups of more than 100,000 persons each.³⁰ In some cases, even, immigrants account for a majority of a country's population (e.g. in Kuwait

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native inhabitants account for only 48.4 percent at present).³¹

Owing to migrations, including internal ones, the ethnic mosaic of the cities has markedly increased in the postwar era. It is indicative, e.g. that in cities of the United States the share of the still unassimilated immigrants is much higher than in the country as a whole.

Processes of inter-ethnic integration (homogenization) are under way intensively in many foreign multi-ethnic countries; by such processes we construe the interaction among basic ethnic units that markedly differ in origin--an interaction that results in the formation of certain common ethnocultural features in these units. Processes of this nature are especially characteristic of the multi-ethnic developing countries such as India, Indonesia, Nigeria, etc. However, it would be quite premature to claim on this basis (as is sometimes done in professional literature) that unified nations exist within the borders of each such country; that is, if the Marxist interpretation of the term "nation" is borne in mind. The formations arising in the course of the processes of inter-ethnic integration represent inter-ethnic or meta-ethnic communities with only a thin amalgam of common ethnocultural traits.

Of major importance to the formation of such communities is the language of inter-national and inter-ethnic communication. Thus, in many African countries the languages of the former colonial powers have been adopted as official languages. At the same time, in many other liberated countries some or other common native languages are supplanting the languages of the former colonial powers. Thus, in Zaire, where French remains the official language, native languages--Lingala in the west and Swahili in the east--are steadily gaining currency.²² In this connection, sometimes the lingua franca in use is the language of one of the lesser nationalities. Most indicative in this respect is the example of Indonesia where the official language is not Javanese (although there are more than 67 million Javanese there) but the so-called Indonesian, basically the Malysian language, although there are only about 8 million Malays in that country.³³ A unique situation has arisen in Malaysia. There, 80 percent of the population are Malaysian-speakers. In recent years, however, English has been steadily gaining currency (especially among the Chinese and Indian population).³⁴ The scope of use of the English language in India is increasing, although officially the propagation of Hindi and Urdu is supported.³⁵

Even so, however, in most cases the lingua franca of a country is the language of its largest ethnic group. This is so, as known, in nearly every West European country. To a certain extent, a similar picture is observed in Latin America, where in most countries the lingua franca is Spanish, as well as in Asian countries, e.g. in Thailand where normally the lingua franca is Siamese [Thai] (Kchonchai), the country's official language. In Africa, this variant may be exemplified by Ethiopia, where the official language is Amharic--the language of Amhara. A somewhat conditional form of this variant exists in Tanzania, where the lingua franca (along with English) is Swahili, which is widely used in all countries of East Africa, although this language is not native to an overwhelming majority of the larger ethnic groups in Tanzania, it is extremely close to the languages of the Bantu-speaking majority of its population.³⁶

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(shipbuilding, textile industry, coal mining, etc.) following World War II; new sectors develop there to a limited extent, which results in an increase in unemployment.³⁹

Inter-ethnic relations under capitalism are sometimes extraordinarily complicated by the differences in the religious affiliation of ethnic groups. Extremely indicative in this respect are the conflicts which had accompanied in 1947 the aforementioned partition of British India into two independent states, India and Pakistan. That partition was, as known, based on the criterion of religion. "The bloodless revolution," as the English imperialists called the partition of India, was accompanied by the resettlement of millions of people, pauperization of the refugees, and mass pogroms and slaughter. These took on a particularly bloody nature in Punjab. According to rough statistics, the number of victims there exceeded 500,000. Virtually no Sikh and Hindu Punjabis have remained in Pakistan--and no Moslem Punjabis in India.⁴⁰ Religious differences similarly are producing explicit consequences in the Ulster conflict, which often develops into armed collisions between the oppressed Catholic Irish minority and the Protestant Anglo-Scottish majority attempting to preserve its privileged position.⁴¹

A substantial role in exacerbating inter-ethnic relations in the foreign countries is also played by such a legacy of the past as discrepancies between ethnic and political boundaries. This is especially characteristic of the developing countries, and primarily of modern Africa. As known, the colonizers there determined the boundaries of their possessions without regard to traditional ethnic boundaries. As a result, in most cases, ethnic groups became dismembered since they often were subdivided among different colonial powers. This situation persisted after the liberation as well, since the new states usually arose within the confines of the former colonies. It should also be considered that the exacerbation of nationalist sentiments among ethnic groups kept in inferior status is to a large degree fostered by the spread of the mass media accompanying the scientific and technological revolution, since this makes extremely graphic, and hence also particularly intolerable, the discrimination they experience.⁴²

The complex ethnic picture of the modern world is changing not only as a result of the ethnic processes proper discussed above. These changes are to a sizable extent associated with demographic processes, which do not evolve uniformly in different ethnic communities.

As known, throughout world history, the rate of increase in global population has been steadily rising. This is demonstrated, in particular, by the fact that the doubling of the world's population from 1 billion to 2 billion required a little more than 100 years (from 1820 until 1927), whereas its increase from 2 to 3 billion took 33 years (by 1960), and from 3 to 4 billion, only 15 years (by 1975). In other words, while 100 years were needed to double the population in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in the mid-twentieth century only 50 years sufficed. At present, the population of our planet amounts to 4.5 billion. By 2000 it is expected to reach about 6 billion.⁴³ According to UN forecasts, by the year 2100 when, apparently world population growth will become zero, there will be approximately 10.5 billion people on earth.⁴⁴

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In a word, bilingualism is becoming increasingly widespread throughout the world. Moreover, there exist extremely frequent cases in which several different nations speak the same language: the most widespread international languages are (according to 1978 data): English, 380 million speakers; Hindi and its kin language Urdu, 275 million; Spanish, 230; Russian, 220; Arabic, Bengali, and Indonesian, 140 each; Portuguese, 125; German, 100; and French, 90.³⁷

Along with the unifying, integrating tendency in modern ethnic processes, differentiating tendencies are under way as well. The latter manifest themselves in both the "inter-state" and intra-state" planes. In the former case, the principal factor in ethnic differentiation is the dismemberment of individual peoples (ethnic communities) among different states, which usually results in the formation of specific ethnocultural features in each of the discrete parts. Most often such dismemberment is a legacy of a relatively distant past, but sometimes this phenomenon takes place in our times as well. Perhaps the most significant such example in terms of its scale is the formation in 1947, as a result of the partition of British India, of two independent states--India and Pakistan, and subsequently the isolation from the latter of the state of Bangladesh, accompanied by mass resettlement of Hindus and Moslems; as a result, two large peoples who had taken the path of national consolidation (Punjabis and Bengalese) have been separated by new political boundaries.³⁸

As for the "intra-state" manifestations of the tendency toward ethnic differentiation, here perhaps the most prominent is the exacerbation of nationalist feelings in comparatively large minorities having a rather inferior status in a given country (as compared with the "basic" majority of its population): the Basques in Spain and France; the Scots and Welsh in England, etc. This entails a distinctive paradox: on the one hand, the economic and cultural integration of these minorities with the basic majority of the population in their countries (Spaniards, Frenchmen, Englishmen) is steadily growing, but on the other there is the aforementioned growth of their nationalist sentiments. As a result, as known, under the conditions of capitalism, there not infrequently arise acute inter-ethnic conflicts. Thus, there are the confrontations between the English and the Irish in Ulster; the Anglo- and Franco-Canadian contradictions in Canada; the actions of the Basques in Spain; the struggle between the Flemish and the Walloons in Belgium; the conflicts between Greeks and Turks on Cyprus; between the Singhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka, and so forth.

Underlying all these inter-ethnic contradictions, like national processes as a whole, in general, is a complex whole of socio-economic, political, and ideological factors. They usually are closely interwoven, although only one or another of them emerge in the foreground at a time.

In the final analysis, the inter-ethnic contradictions usually are determined by socio-economic factors. This is demonstrated very graphically in cases in which, owing to the non-uniformity of socio-economic development inherent in capitalism, changes take place in the relations among and roles of discrete nationalities in the domestic life of multi-national states. In particular, a worsening in the economic situation of discrete national minorities is a root cause of the exacerbation of ethnic contradictions in Great Britain. This concerns primarily the decline of the traditional sectors of the economy of North Ireland, Scotland, and Wales

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Currently the rate of population increase varies broadly in individual regions of the world, in different countries. As a result the population ratio of different regions of the world is changing markedly. Thus, while in 1959 the inhabitants of the developed countries (excluding the USSR), i.e. of non-USSR Europe, North America, Australia, Japan, and the United Arab Republic had accounted for 24.6 percent of the world's population and the developing countries--non-USSR Asia (excluding Japan), Africa (excluding the United Arab Republic), and Latin America accounted for 67.9 percent, in 1978 the corresponding figures were 20.8 and 73.0 percent, respectively. Thus, the share of the former regions decreased 3.8 percent and the share of the latter, increased 5.1 percent,⁴⁵ i.e. the gap between the populations of these two groups of countries has increased nearly 9 percent in 20 years.

Marked differences between the developing and economically developed countries continue with respect to the basic demographic indicators. Thus, birth rate in the developing countries is nearly twice as high as in the developed ones, but death rate in the latter is nearly 35 percent lower than in the former. Correspondingly there is the extremely broad gap between the average lifespans (44 years in Africa against 71 years in Europe), which also exists with respect to the ratio between the adult population and children. In the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, children usually account for more than 40 percent of the population, whereas in the developed countries they account for from one-fourth to one-third of the population (with the lowest proportions existing in Sweden, 20.7 percent, and Hungary, 20.8 percent). The developed countries usually are characterized by a high proportion of the elderly. This proportion is the highest in the FRG (21.3 percent), Sweden (21.0 percent), and Austria (20.5 percent).

The world's regions also differ greatly in so-called median age (with one-half of people being younger than that age and the other half, older). Thus, in non-USSR Europe median age is 32.5 years; in North Africa, 28.9 years; in Australia and Oceania, 25.5 years; in non-USSR Asia, 21.2 years; in Africa, 17.8 years (in the USSR, 29.3 years). In this context, the "youngest" countries are Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Nicaragua, and Surinam--where the median age is 16.0 years, and the "oldest" countries are Sweden, the FRG, and the GDR, where it is more than 35 years.⁴⁶ All this inevitably affects the manpower resources of countries.

There also exist regional differences in population structure by gender: in Africa and Latin America the proportions of males and females are roughly equal; in non-USSR Europe there are 12.9 million fewer males; while in non-USSR Asia, conversely, there are 46.9 million fewer females.⁴⁷

What then are the developmental prospects of ethnodemographic processes on the scale of the world as a whole? The answer to this question largely hinges on the general tendencies of the future rate of change in population reproduction on our planet. Among demographers there is no unanimity in determining these tendencies. It is not unlikely, however, that in the future the differences in age structure of population among the various countries will increase at a slower rate, although the differences in the proportions of population inhabiting different regions of the world will clearly continue to increase for a long time yet.⁴⁸ Thus, according

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to UN forecasts, South Asia will become the world's most densely populated region in 2100. Its population will increase from the current 1.4 billion to 4.1 billion, which will by then account for some 40 percent of the world's population. In 2100 as well, the population of the African Continent will increase roughly to 2.19 billion from 400 million, i.e. it will account for about 20 percent of the inhabitants of our planet. In that year, too, the population of Latin America will increase to 1.8 billion from 364 million; of Europe, to 540 million from 484 million; and of North America, to 318 million from 248 million.⁴⁹

As for the changes in the population ratio among the world's countries, they are a resultant of the interaction of demographic and ethnic processes. Altogether, the proportion of the major ethnic groups in the nations of the world will increase. Thus while in 1961 there were 44 countries with a population of more than 10 million each, which accounted for 75 percent of the world's population, in 1978 the number of these countries rose to 67 and their share in the world population was about 80 percent.⁵⁰ We are thus dealing with one of the manifestations of the integrative tendency of modern ethnic processes in the sphere of demography. This tendency manifests itself in other forms as well, e.g. in the narrowing of the ethnic mosaic of the inhabited world, in the global spread of the so-called urban culture, etc. Judging from all, in the final analysis, the ethnointegrative tendency is the dominant one, but, as we have seen, its course runs across its dialectical and sometimes acutely contradictory interaction with the ethnodifferentiating tendency. For this very reason, under capitalism, as pointed out previously, the current ethnic situation is pregnant in conflicts between nationalities and ethnic groups. It is not by accident that nearly all the present-day conflicts, all the hot spots on the planet, whether they arise in the Near East, in West Europe, in South East Asia, in southern Africa, or on the American Continent, display a distinct ethno-nationalist or ethno-racial coloring.

Particularly evident against this background are the achievements of the Leninist nationalities' policy in our country, which convincingly demonstrate the well-known thesis of the founders of Marxism that the disappearance of class antagonisms will entail the disappearance of antagonisms among nationalities. These achievements are, on the whole, widely known. Hence, I will confine myself to the most general information on ethnic processes proper in the USSR and the countries of the socialist community,⁵¹ as well as on the demographic aspects of these processes.

Recently, in particular, there has been a marked change in the numerical proportions of the peoples of our country. These changes are chiefly due to definite differences in the reproduction rate of the populations of various regions of this country. Thus, during the 20-year period between the 1959 and 1979 censuses, the population of the southern regions of this country increased by 75-100 percent and more, whereas in the other regions the increase was 10-20 percent and sometimes even less.⁵² This is inseparably associated with the problem--pointed out at the 26th CPSU Congress--of the ethnodemographic aspects of manpower reproduction--the surplus of manpower resources in some regions and their shortage in others. This, in its turn, raises to the forefront the problem of conducting an ethnically differentiated demographic policy adapted to the acute need to promote an increase in birth rate among the peoples for which it is at present particularly low. This problem has been, as known, mentioned at the 26th Congress: the report of comrade L. I. Brezhnev especially pointed out that: "a provision is being made for increasing child allowances, especially in the case of giving birth to second and

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third children."⁵³ This proposal has already been partially embodied in new legislation.⁵⁴

As for the ethnosocial processes occurring at present in the USSR and other countries of socialism, the aforementioned teachings of Lenin about two tendencies in the nationalities' problem are of immense significance to understanding these processes. Of course, in this case, a mechanical application to the socialist society of the theory of such tendencies operating in the capitalist society would be absolutely incorrect. After all, the economic foundation of a people, its class structure, and spiritual image get radically altered upon its transition from capitalism to socialism. But the ethnic qualities inhering in a people then survive to a large extent (Russians remain Russians, Georgians remain Georgians, Uzbeks remain Uzbeks).

Hence, there exist both similarities and qualitative differences between the integrative and differentiating tendencies present under capitalism and under socialism, as regards ethnic relations. The development of the various peoples under socialism proceeds under the influence of such new patterns of ethnic relations as the affirmation of the equality of races, peoples, and languages, and national self-determination. The process of inter-ethnic integration, rapprochement of peoples, likewise unfolds on a different economic and social basis under socialism. The principal feature of this process then becomes equalization of the levels of economic and cultural development of the different peoples, the formation of the same type of social structure among them. This is convincingly demonstrated by the historic experience of the evolution in the USSR of a new historic community--the Soviet nation, representing the first ever inter-national, inter-ethnic formation in the history of mankind to arise on the basis of socialism. The steady consolidation of the socio-economic and moral-political unity of the peoples and nationalities constituting this community is accompanied by the formation of a general Soviet culture, the spreading of the Russian language as the lingua franca, and the strengthening of a unified general Soviet consciousness.

The processes of rapprochement of nationalities under socialism are not limited to any single country. To one extent or another, they encompass the entire community of socialist countries. In this connection, this tendency manifests itself far from uniformly in different spheres. It is very explicit, for example, in the sphere of economics. On the scale of the socialist community, this is manifested by the expansion of specialization and co-production, representing a characteristic feature of economic collaboration under conditions of socialism.⁵⁷

Under socialism, the tendencies toward the development and rapprochement of nationalities are strikingly reflected in the sphere of social-class relations. As characteristic of the socialist community, the development of the social structure of the nationalities at the same time signifies the establishment of uniform social parameters on the scale of our entire country and the entire community of socialist countries.⁵⁸

An intensive process of increasing rapprochement of the spiritual life of the Soviet nation with that of the nations of the other countries of the socialist commu-

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nity is under way, especially as regards intensifying their common ideological interests. Along with the general socio-economic premises, an important role in this context belongs to the varied forms of joint ideological activity, extensive exchange of cultural values, and combining of scientific potential. In particular, socialist countries cooperate on a broad scale in the field of education and enlightenment. A major role here is played by mutual exchange of students. During the period from the 1950 until the early 1970s alone, more than 50,000 students from other socialist countries were graduated from higher educational institutions in the USSR. Exchange of scientific and technical information among the socialist countries has reached a major scale.

An important role in melding the spiritual life of the socialist countries is played by their growing cultural exchange. This refers to creative encounters of writers, artists, and art experts, festivals of various arts, exhibitions, days of culture, regular radio and TV programs, joint work of representatives of the creative intelligentsia from various countries in creating works of art, etc.

All these growing contacts significantly contribute to both the equalization of the cultural level and the consolidation of the community of ideological interests in the spiritual life of the countries of the socialist community.⁵⁹ This is leading to the rise of a new socialist (communist) civilization,⁶⁰ to an important stride forward on the path toward the emergence of the future global socio-cultural human community.

FOOTNOTES

1. S. I. Bruk, "Naseleniye mira. Etnograficheskiy spravochnik" [The World's Population. An Ethnographic Guidebook], Moscow, Nauka, 1981, p 165, Table V.
2. For more detail see V. I. Kozlov, "Etnicheskaya demografiya" [Ethnic Demography], Moscow, Statistika, 1977, pp 33-46; "Strany i narody. Zemlya i chelovechestvo. Obshchiy obzor" [Lands and Nations. The Earth and Mankind. A General Survey], Moscow, Mysl', 1978, pp 180, 337-340; Bruk, op. cit., pp 165-167, 170, 414, 427, 605, 637, 657, 658, 870-880.
3. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 24, p 124.
4. See Yu.V. Bromley, "The International and the National in the Construction of Socialism," SOVETSKAYA ETHNOGRAFIYA, No 5, 1977, p 11.
5. Note the need to distinguish between the terms "internationalization" and "internationalism." In the former case we are dealing with objective processes leading to the rise of international phenomena, the formation of international unity. This precisely is the sense in which the term "internationalization" was used by V. I. Lenin, speaking of the "internationalization of economic relations," "internationalization of capital." As for the term "internationalism," it pertains to the sphere of social consciousness and denotes the adequate reflection in that consciousness of the tendency toward the internationalization of the life of society, representing a historical law, The rise and existence

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of internationalism stem from the fundamental interests of the working class and manifest themselves in its ideology, politics, and social practice. The basic goals of internationalism consist not only in the rapprochement of nations but also in the assurance of complete unity of the working class so that it may accomplish the task of fully liberating all workers from exploitation as well as of building socialism and communism.

6. Lenin, op. cit.
7. Yu. Ostrovit'yanov, "The Creative Might of Lenin's Thought and Present-Day Capitalism," KOMMUNIST, No 7, 1981, p 82.
8. See A. M. Kul'kin, P. V. Smirnov, "The Internationalization of Modern Capital: Basic Contradictions and Development Trends," VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 4, 1979; R. S. Ovchinnikov, "Transnational Monopolies and the Historical Process," NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA, No 5, 1979.
9. See "Economic Integration in the Modern World," PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, No 7, 1973, pp 15-17.
10. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 36, p 332.
11. "Imperializm 70-kh godov: uglublenniye obshchego krizisa" [Imperialism of the 1970s: the Deepening of the General Crisis], The Prague, 1974, p 81.
12. "Mezhdunarodnoye soveshchaniye kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiy. Dokumenty i materialy" [International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties. Documents and Materials], Moscow, Politizdat, 1969, p 296.
13. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 24, p 124.
14. V. S. Semenov, "Internatsionalizm i obshchestvennyy progress" [Internationalism and Social Progress], Moscow, 1978, pp 406-407.
15. K. N. Brutents, "Osvobodivshiesya strany v 70-e gody" [The Liberated Countries in the 1970s], Moscow, 1979, p 135.
16. "Strany i narody," op. cit., p 323.
17. See "Massovaya kul'tura--illuzii i deystvitel'nost'" [Mass Culture--Illusions and Reality], Moscow, Iskusstvo, 1975.
18. See M. T. Iovchuk, "Problems of the Development of Soviet Spiritual Culture and the Modern Struggle of Ideas," VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 3, 1976, p 53.
19. See "Etnicheskiye protsessy v stranakh Yugo-Vostochnoy Azii" [Ethnic Processes in the Countries of Southeast Asia], Moscow, Nauka, 1974, p 147; B. V. Andrianov, "Formative Aspects of African Nations (as Exemplified by Kenya)," "Rassy i narody" [Races and Nations], 7th ed., Moscow, Science, 1977, pp 175-176; R. N. Ismailova, "Etnicheskiye problemy sovremennoy Tropicheskoy Afriki" [Ethnic Problems of Modern Tropical Africa], Moscow, Nauka, 1973, pp 183-185; B. V. Andrianov, R. N. Ismailova, "Ethnic Groups and Ethnic Processes in Africa," SOVetskaya ETHNOGRAFIYA, No 5, 1979, p 27.

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20. "Natsional'nyye problemy Kanady" [Nationality Problems of Canada], Moscow, Nauka, 1979, pp 12-13.
21. "Natsionnal'nyye protsessy v Tsentral'noy Amerike i Meksike" [Ethnic Processes in Central America and Mexico], Moscow, Nauka, 1974, pp 116, 154, 174, 217.
22. See Sh. A. Bogina, V. i. Kozlov, E. L. Nitoburg, and L. N. Fursova, "Ethnic Processes and Relations in the Countries of West Europe and North America," SOV. ETNOGRAFIYA, No 5, 1975, pp 10-11.
23. V. I. Kozlov, "Ethnoracial Changes in the Composition of the Population of Great Britain," SOV. ETNOGRAFIYA, No 4, 1980.
24. Bogina et al., op. cit., p 7.
25. See "Ob etnicheskikh kitaytsakh vo V'yetname" [On Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam], Moscow, Progress, 1979, p 12.
26. See Bogina et al., op. cit., p 8.
27. See M. Ya. Berzina, "Formirovaniye etnicheskogo sostava naseleniya Kanady" [The Formation of the Ethnic Composition of the Population of Canada], Moscow, Nauka, 1979, pp 26 and ff.
28. See V. I. Kozlov, "Dinamika chislennosti narodov" [Population Dynamics of Peoples], Moscow, Nauka, 1969, p 329.
29. See e.g. PRAVDA, 1981, 10 Oct.
30. See Bruk, op. cit., p 331.
31. Ibid., p 473.
32. See L'vova, E. S., "The Ethnic Situation and Policy of the State of West Equatorial Africa," "Rassy i narody," 7th ed., Moscow, Nauka, 1977, p 189.
33. See "Yugo-Vostochnaya Aziya: problemy regional'noy obshchnosti" [Southeast Asia: Problems of Regional Community], Moscow, Nauka, 1977, p 154.
34. See Yu. A. Osipov, "On Problems of a Common Language in the Young Independent States of Southeast Asia," "Rassy i narody," 5th ed., Moscow, Nauka, 1975, pp 138-140.
35. "Etnicheskiye protsessy v stranakh Yuzhnoy Azii" [Ethnic Processes in the Countries of South Asia], Moscow, Nauka, 1975, pp 95-99.
36. See Ismailova, op. cit., p 198; "Etnicheskiye protsessy v stranakh Yugo-Vostochnoy Azii," op. cit., p 273.
37. See Bruk, op. cit., p 87.

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38. See V. I. Kochnev, "Ethnopolitical Situation on the Indian Subcontinent," "Rassy i narody," 5th ed., p 105.
39. See Bogina, op. cit., p 6.
40. See Kochnev, op. cit., p 105.
41. See Bogina, op. cit., p 6.
42. See U. V. Bromley, "Sovremennyye problemy etnografii" [Present-Day Problems of Ethnography], Moscow, Science, 1981, p 322.
43. See Bruk, op. cit., pp 16, 24.
44. See PRAVDA, 1981, 16 June.
45. See Bruk, op. cit., pp 16, 542, 684; "Natsional'noye i internatsional'noye v sovremennom mire" [The National and the International in the Modern World], Kishinev, Shtiintsa, 1981, pp 92-94.
46. See Bruk, op. cit., pp 19-29, 39-42.
47. Ibid., pp 42-43.
48. In the world as a whole toward the late 1960s the annual population increase stabilized at the level of 70-73 million, whereupon it was followed by a decrease: from 19.5 in 1970 to 17.8 percent in 1978. This had been chiefly due to the rather drastic decrease in the mean annual rate of population increase in non-USSR Asia and Latin America on the whole. (Bruk, op. cit., pp 20-29.)
49. PRAVDA, 1980, 16 June.
50. Bruk, op. cit., p 93.
51. For more detail see Bromley, SOV. ETNOGRAFIYA, No 5, 1977, op. cit., pp 11-12.
52. See S. I. Bruk, "The Soviet Nation," NAUKA I ZHIZN', No 4, 1981, pp 78-80.
53. "Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p 55.
54. PRAVDA, 1981, 31 March, 31 September.
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56. See I. V. Dudinskiy, "The Operation of Economic Laws of Socialism in the World Socialist Economy," OBSHCHESTVENNYE NAUKI, No 2, 1977, pp 40-41; B. M. Pugachev, "Sblizheniye stran sotsializma. Voprosy teorii i praktiki" [The Rapprochement of the Countries of Socialism. Problems of Theory and Practice], Moscow, Nauka, 1981, pp 147-172.

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56. For more detail see "Sovremenennye etnicheskiye protsessy v SSSR" [Present-Day Ethnic Processes in the USSR], 2nd ed., Moscow, Nauka, 1977.
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NATIONAL

GUIDANCE FOR LECTURERS ON 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF USSR

[Editorial Report] Moscow SLOVO LEKTORA in Russian No 5, May 1982, carries on pp 1-8 a 5500-word article titled "The Ever-Stronger Unity of the Soviet People" by M. Sergeyev. The article provides explicit instructions for Znaniye Society lecturers on what and how to say about the 60th anniversary of the USSR. The following points are "recommended": "The establishment of a society homogeneous in terms of social class is the basis of the social-political, ideological, and international unity of the Soviet people. The leading role of the working class in this process." "Friendship of the peoples is a powerful moving force of societal progress in the USSR." And "In unity with the people is the strength of the party; in unity with the party, in its leadership is the strength of the people." The article provides extensive amplifications on each of these points. [COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Znaniye", 1982]

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REGIONAL

INFLUENCE OF RUSSIAN LANGUAGE ON UZBEK

Moscow VOPROSY YAZYKOZNANIYA in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 82 pp 75-79

[Article by I. Yu. Asfandiyarov: "Russian Lexical Borrowings in the Uzbek Language"]

[Excerpts] Linguistic construction during the Soviet period is characterized by an intensive development of the national languages of the peoples of the USSR, and by an expansion of their social functions. "The Soviet Union," as is noted by F. P. Filin, "has turned into a country of universal literacy in which all of the national languages, those which have long had writing and those which have newly acquired it, have become a powerful lever of cultural progress, and have risen to the level of the most developed languages of the world which are capable of transmitting all of the information that has been accumulated by modern civilization." [1]

Of all of the layers of language, vocabulary has been subject to the greatest changes, having been added to during this period by an enormous number of new words and meanings. The enrichment and development of the word composition of the national languages of the peoples of the USSR is being accomplished along two lines: a) by means of the creation of words through a language's own internal resources, including the direct translation of foreign language lexemes--everyday words and terms; b) by means of the borrowing and assimilation of foreign language lexemes; the process of creating semi-direct translations may be included here. It is the great Russian language [2-4] which has become for the fraternal Soviet peoples the language of inter-national communication that is the foreign language source for the Uzbek language, as it is for other languages of the USSR. It is very characteristic here that the Russian language which itself has absorbed a substantial strata of international lexicon, chiefly in the area of terminology, transmits this wealth to the national languages of the peoples of the USSR.

As the specialists point out, the most rapidly developing part of the word composition of any literary language in the Soviet Union is terminology. In most of the languages of the Soviet peoples, 70-80 percent of the new scientific and technical, socio-political, pedagogical and other terms is made up of borrowings from the Russian language and through it from other languages. But also purely Russian words are borrowed. According to the definition of Sh. R. Rashidov, "terms, concepts, and categories which have been engendered

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by the modern Russian language enter organically and grow into all of the other languages of the peoples of our country like, incidentally, the languages of many other peoples of the world. Who today on our planet does not know, for example, the Russian word "sputnik," "Bolshevik," and "soyuz," the Russian term "pyatiletka," such a philosophical category as "Leninism," and hundreds of other Russian words. They are not in need of translation. They are understandable to everybody." [5] Thanks to the common borrowings from the Russian language of both ancient Russian words and words of international origin, a common lexical fund is being formed in the languages of the peoples of the USSR which is considerably facilitating their inter-national communication.

Even during pre-revolutionary times the development and enrichment of the word composition of the Uzbek language took place to a definite extent under the influence of a growing number of loan words from the Russian language which resulted from the socio-political and economic changes in the life of the region when the Uzbek population was in direct contact with the Russian population. The process of borrowing became especially intensified during the last third of the 19th century. Russian words were assimilated chiefly in oral communication and, for this reason, most of them changed their phonetic make-up.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the enrichment of the lexicon of the national languages under the influence of the Russian language, as well as the lexicon of the Russian language under the influence of the national languages, is in essence a progressive phenomenon which promotes not only an expansion of the vocabularies of the borrowing languages, but also to a definite extent their further development as a whole, a fact which has become possible only in socialist society which guarantees the free and equal development of the languages of the peoples of the USSR.

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